And more than a year of effort to create a new Iraqi army and police force has not produced results. On paper, the interim government employs almost 200,000 soldiers and policemen. But Iraqi officials admit in private that no more than three battalions are reliable.
They also complain about the “seesaw factor” — when things are going well for the new government, the new Iraqi army and police recruits show enthusiasm and resolve but, at the first sign of a setback, they switch to the insurgency to save their skin.
Yet despite almost daily attacks, most Iraqis appear determined to vote. Almost 75% of those eligible have registered and more than 6,000 candidates, from communists to monarchists, democrats and Islamists, are contesting the 270 seats of the national assembly.
Campaigning for the election is most intense in the Shi’ite and Kurdish areas. Meetings are held in mosques, schools, village halls and the homes of the candidates — where would-be voters are often treated to meals. In parts of southern Iraq, big tribal tents are doubling as town halls for the election.
For the first time, candidates are also using advertising and PR experts to promote themselves. But the main focus is on persuading Iraqis to vote in the largest possible numbers.
“We know that there are criminals determined to blow us up,” says Abdul-Hussein Hindawi, head of the independent electoral commission. “But we cannot allow fear to shape our future. Most Iraqis know that they must take risks to build a free society.”
Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani, first among equals of the Shi’ite clergy, has issued a fatwa urging everyone to vote. “Taking part in the elections and building a democratic system are religious duties,” he asserts.
The election is based on proportional representation. Under current projections this could lead to a hung parliament in which Shi’ites would represent the largest bloc but would be unable to form a majority without Kurdish and Sunni support.
Most of the participants have already approved a draft constitution turning Iraq into a democratic, pluralist and federal state. They have also agreed that at least 25% of the seats should go to women. But there are divisions over the role of the state in the economy, the sharing of oil revenues and water resources, and the relationship between secular legislation and Islamic sharia (theological) law. These are issues that intensely interest a majority of Iraqis.
“I am hungry to vote,” says Ghazban Fayyad, owner of a bookstall in downtown Baghdad. “All I hope is that they will not blow me up before I have cast my ballot.”
Iraq today is the scene of several separate but interrelated conflicts, each of which could kill hopes of stability. One conflict pits the Shi’ites, some 60% of the population, against Sunnis (15%). Some Sunnis are opposed to the election because it could end their dream of regaining the dominant position they had in government since the British turned Iraq into a state in 1921.
Current forecasts say a majority of people will go to the polls in all but four of Iraq’s 18 provinces — these four are in the Sunni triangle and account for 7% of the population. One idea is to hold elections there later in the year after security has improved.
A second conflict pits the Kurds against Arab Shi’ites and Sunnis. The ultimate dream of the Kurds is to have their own state. But, knowing this to be impossible in the foreseeable future, they are determined to secure as much autonomy as possible. The Shi’ites and Sunnis see this as a threat to central government authority.
A third conflict is between the US-led coalition and Iran and Syria, who fear that if the US succeeds in Iraq, they could be the next targets for regime change. They are doing all they can to make sure the Iraqi election does not produce a pro-American majority.
In fact, most Arab powers are opposed to Washington’s plans for a democratic Iraq, preferring a “lite” version of Arab authoritarian regimes. These powers have no influence with the Shi’ite majority but have some links with the Sunnis and are encouraging a Sunni boycott of the polls.
The best-case scenario for Iraq in 2005 is as follows: the election is held, producing a new government of national unity. Claiming a people-based legitimacy, such a government would deprive the insurgency of its claim of fighting against foreign occupation. The US and allies could scale down their military presence while accelerating the recruitment and deployment of the new Iraqi armed forces and police. That would make it possible for the US-led forces to be withdrawn by 2007.
Also in the best-case scenario, Iraq could mobilise its immense manpower and natural resources to rebuild its economy. A little- noticed report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued last November, shows that even now the Iraqi economy is, relatively speaking, performing better than any other in the Arab Middle East. The report makes a prediction that some might find audacious: in the next decade, Iraq could emerge as the engine of growth for the whole region.
The IMF experts are not being frivolous. Iraq sits on top of the world’s second-largest oil deposits. It is the only Middle Eastern nation with substantial water resources and arable land and has the highest rates of literacy in the Arab world, plus a vast pool of skilled workers.
The worst-case scenario is equally stark: widespread violence could disrupt the election while a mass Sunni boycott casts doubt on the results. The insurgents extend their attacks to Shi’ite areas, provoking counterattacks. This could lead to a de facto partition of the country or an intermittent ethnic war of the kind Lebanon experienced in the 1970s and 1980s.
President Bush might try to stick it out but any successor, lacking the stomach or the desire to stay the course, might not. Then the Kurds could decide to set up a breakaway state, provoking clashes with Turkey and Iran; and Iraq could become a black hole sucking the Middle East into the unknown.
Which of the two scenarios is more likely? Well, ask me ba’ad — after the election.
