Foreign agents attempting to buy “innocent” components for weapons of mass destruction from British companies are still able to exploit Britain’s export laws despite the introduction of licensing restrictions, a group of senior MPs said yesterday.

Some agents posing as ordinary importers were clever at burying their requests for “dual-use” parts, components that could be switched from a lawful civilian function to a military one, in a long list of innocuous products, the parliamentary report said.

Highlighting the dangers arising from cunning weapons proliferators, the Quadripartite Committee, which comprises senior members of the Commons Defence, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry and International Development committees, urged ministers to make the law even tougher.

The MPs said that current regulations covered transactions where the exporter had grounds for suspicion that a product could end up in a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon system; or where the Government had intelligence that exports of high-tech equipment were destined for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In 2003 the licensing laws were broadened to cover the transfer of WMD end-use technology by any means, including “face-to-face communication, personal demonstration or by handing over material recorded on documents or disks”. The committee said, however, that there was no requirement on a potential exporter to “make attempts to check that a proposed recipient of technology did not intend to use information in a WMD programme”. Where exporters behaved recklessly they might breach the law, the MPs said, but under current regulations there was no obligation for a British exporter to investigate all casual business acquaintances.

Experts had told the committee that there was only a limited amount of time that a busy exporter of dual-use goods could devote to evaluating a potential customer’s intentions. “The proliferators are aware of this, and often bury their desired items in a long list of innocuous products,” they said.

Revenue & Customs could seize goods only where there was evidence that the exporter already had grounds to suspect that the products were for a WMD use; or, having been informed that the items could not be exported without a licence, the exporter attempted to do so.

The classic exploitation of Western export regulations took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Sadd-am Hussein’s agents bought components from British and other European companies for a “supergun”. In 1990 British customs officers in Mid-dlesbrough seized huge gun parts disguised as oil pipes bound for Iraq.

The MPs acknowledged that it was not yet justified to force exporters to ask about the intended purpose for every dual-use product and withhold sales when they had suspicions. They recommended, however, that the regulations should allow items to be seized “where there is good intelligence that they are likely to be used for a WMD end-use, irrespective of the knowledge and intentions of the exporter”.

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