A few years ago, before September 11, it was fashionable to declare “the end of history” — that the age-old conflict between different kinds of society was over and liberal capitalism had secured a permanent victory. Globally that thesis may look a little premature now; but applied closer to home it works, up to a point.
Not only has the 20th-century contest between socialism and capitalism come to an end, new evidence from the YouGov research company shows that for all bar a small minority of voters the electorate no longer divides along traditional left-right lines.
Just over half the population still describe themselves as left or right, but these labels have little connection with economic ideology. The typical right-of- centre voter is only slightly keener than the left-of-centre voter on cutting taxes or the superiority of private enterprise.
However, the obvious conclusion that left and right have lost their meanings is wrong. Instead, the meanings have changed. The argument between left and right voters is not so much about economics as cultural values. Britain’s new political axis concerns such issues as crime, Europe and immigration — in short, how best to secure each family’s safety against “them”, be they burglars, illegal asylum seekers or intrusive Eurocrats.
In the short term this new axis will shape the way the public views the general election campaign. We have seen the effects already. Some of the sharpest exchanges between the parties in recent weeks have concerned cultural values.
What is less clear is whether Britain’s new political axis is a fleeting thing that will not survive much beyond this year’s election, or evidence of a lasting, fundamental change in what defines parties and voters. Could it be that the contest between social small “l” liberalism and social small “c” conservatism will be the defining battle for domestic British politics in the 21st century, much as the contest between socialism and capitalism defined politics in the 20th century?
The signs that the tectonic plates are shifting come from a YouGov survey for The Sunday Times. More than 2,000 electors in Britain were asked where they stood on 32 issues ranging from traditional ideological matters (tax, nationalisation, redistribution, public services, the regulation of large companies) to broad cultural issues (national sovereignty, immigration, capital punishment, racism, the European Union) and personal morality (sex, drugs, abortion). Respondents were also asked how they would vote and where they placed themselves on a scale from left wing to right wing.
The data were processed by Chris Lightfoot, a social statistician, to uncover links between attitudes to issues and how these connected to voters’ party support and their location on the left-right scale. The results showed where typical supporters of each party, and typical inhabitants of each point on the left-right political spectrum, are located on the two axes of political debate — the traditional dispute between socialist and free-market policies, and the cultural divide between social liberalism and conservatism. These terms can mean different things to different people. Here, a pure socialist wants more redistribution, more nationalisation and more tax-and-spend. A free-market enthusiast favours a low-tax, free-enterprise, minimum-government society.
Social liberals support immigration, penal reform and greater overseas aid. Social conservatives oppose immigration, favour capital punishment and want Britain to leave the European Union.
The study shows that cultural differences are now far greater than ideological differences; most people cleave fairly closely to the ideological centre.
When we analyse responses by party support, some telling findings emerge. For example, the average Labour supporter is very close to the centre on both measures, while Liberal Democrat voters tend to be more socialist and more socially liberal, but only slightly. The average Tory voter has a more distinct profile as a social conservative, but is barely perceptibly to the right on the question of free-market versus socialist economy.
Two cautionary notes should be added. The first is that individuals, as opposed to typical party voters, vary enormously. The second is that most people inhabit areas nearer the centre than the extremes: in other words, although Britain’s political axis has shifted from ideology to culture, the battle lines are still blurred.
Millions of voters live somewhere near the mid-point between social liberalism and social conservatism, as well as the mid-point between the socialist and free-market visions of society.
To complicate matters further, individuals are often socially conservative on some issues and socially liberal on others. One of the big questions for the next few years is whether more people develop a more consistently liberal or conservative outlook.
If they do, the nature of the battle between the parties could change sharply. As in America, election campaigns will increasingly become about values. However, the list of values that win elections is not the same.
In America the religious right has influenced the agenda, talking about personal morality issues such as sex and abortion. Britain is different. Both matters were tested in YouGov’s survey, and although many people feel strongly about them, such feelings are not linked to party support or where people put themselves on the left-right spectrum.
The values that could shape the future of British politics are far more to do with wider public concerns about what sort of people and nation we are, how far to embrace outsiders, and which party will do most to keep us safe in a turbulent world.
