THE SPLIT over the Iraq war, which ran through the Labour party, reached into Tony Blair’s innermost circle, according to an updated biography of the prime minister.

Key Downing Street advisers including Alastair Campbell, former director of communications, and Baroness Morgan, former director of political and government relations, are revealed to have had “private reservations” about the prime minister’s strategy.

The disclosures have been made by Blair’s biographer Anthony Seldon, who has benefited from insider accounts that the government is now seeking to suppress.

At the outbreak of war, a gung-ho attitude seemed to pervade Downing Street. According to an interview with Morgan: “. . . he (Blair) wanted big maps on the wall of the den (Blair’s office) so he could follow the progress of the troops. We wouldn’t let him. He really would have liked a sandpit with tanks.”

Seldon is understood to have had access to the private unpublished papers of key officials. Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador in Washington; Lance Price, former deputy to Campbell at Downing Street; and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations and then special envoy to Iraq, are all understood to have kept detailed records and were all interviewed by Seldon.

The updated version of Seldon’s biography of Blair draws heavily on their revelatory material — the publication of which Whitehall officials are now attempting to block.

The Cabinet Office has halted Price’s plans to publish his memoirs while Greenstock’s forthcoming book is to be edited before publication. Meyer intends to publish his memoirs in the autumn, after official clearance.

The most sensitive sections of Seldon’s biography detail the run-up to the war in Iraq during 2002 and 2003, Blair’s relationship with the White House, and attempts to persuade the United Nations to back action.

Decisions were made largely by a tight group of Downing Street advisers, diplomats and intelligence chiefs working with the prime minister. However, Seldon discovered that even within this group there was unease about Blair’s actions. “Even No 10 was divided, with Jonathan Powell (Blair’s chief of staff) strongly advocating closeness to the (American) administration, and Sally (Baroness) Morgan in particular pressing for the need to go down the UN route, ” writes Seldon.

“Many senior diplomats in the Foreign Office were deeply concerned but failed to speak out . . . Within his closest team in No 10, Campbell and Morgan had private reservations while (David) Manning (Blair’s foreign policy adviser) was often uneasy . . . The intelligence chiefs (Sir John Scarlett, Sir Stephen Lander and Sir Richard Dearlove) were not counselling caution.”

Seldon reveals the alarm of Blair’s inner circle when told that the invasion would not receive the backing of the UN, after diplomatic efforts had failed.

“On 11 March, Greenstock reported to Downing Street that the second resolution attempt was losing ground,” he writes.

“‘I’m not sure we are going to get it through,’ Blair told his aides in No 10, Manning, Powell, Campbell and Morgan. ‘Hell, we are stuck then!’ one of them said as they began to ask themselves quite how they ended up in this position. Some in No 10 were clearly shocked to find themselves in a box with no escape plan.”

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