The loss of more troops in Afghanistan shocks the nation but not the soldiers. They are on the offensive and know that such operations are a dangerous business. They have pushed out from their bases, UK troops in the north and US marines a few miles to the south, to establish better control in the Sangin and Helmand valleys.

This is designed to keep Taliban forces on the run and to create in the minds of the Afghan people a sense, ahead of next month’s elections, that the Kabul government and Nato troops are a firm presence in Helmand.

The military equation does not bother Nato troops too much. They can always chase the Taliban out of an area once they shift into gear.

Taliban commanders have made Helmand their key objective and new recruits to their units flow in from Pakistan, but they are not well trained or well led. Unless they get very lucky, Taliban forces cannot overwhelm any unit of Nato troops who are so much better equipped and backed by air power. Hence they resort to improvised explosive devices. IEDs can be devastatingly effective even against the most heavily armoured vehicles, but they are the technique of the terrorist; not decisive and not the weapon that will win a campaign.

Nor do the troops doing the fighting in Afghanistan criticise their equipment. What they have got is close to state of the art for infantrymen and it works pretty well. Equipment problems lie more in the availability of back-up.

Helicopters for the UK’s forces are still far too few and heavily overworked. At the start of the British operation two weeks ago American helicopters dropped Black Watch troops into their assault around Babaji.

Meanwhile, the mixed fleet of UK armoured vehicles is at full stretch. Appropriate vehicles are not always where they need to be in a fast-moving operation, and the “airbridge” that ferries supplies to and from the battlefront is groaning and might easily collapse.

What the soldiers on the ground would most like to see are more comrades being brought in. What they fear is that they will have to do it all again. Soldiers can rationalise the loss of their comrades when achieving their objectives but it becomes hard to fight and die for territory that is relinquished to the enemy.

The key test in this offensive is not chasing Taliban forces out of the most populated areas of Helmand, nor tolerating the sad and inevitable deaths. The military are confident on both these scores.

They do, however, need to be reassured that the Kabul government can get some grip on the administration of Helmand, that some worthwhile development will flow through it into the local economy and that there is a coherent international strategy for dealing with narcotics production.

This offensive has already created internal refugees and more will follow. Local people in Helmand are cowed by the war that flows around them. Ultimately, the campaign is about them and their inclination to stop fearing the Taliban and start trusting the government.

This military offensive can create some of the conditions for that, but it cannot make it happen.

Professor Michael Clarke is director of the Royal United Services Institute

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