Smash hit

Mr Gilligan’s reference to Mr Campbell in connection with the September dossier being “sexed up” with the insertion of the 45-minutes claim is regarded as the weakest element in the BBC case.

Although that allegation was made by Mr Gilligan in the Mail on Sunday after his original report was broadcast on May 29, the BBC accepts that it has “vicarious responsibility” for the newspaper article because it had been approved before publication. BBC executives have said that it always regarded the Campbell reference as an “ambiguous” or “generic” word for political pressure on the intelligence services. Mr Gilligan himself appeared to waver on this allegation in his second cross-examination by the Foreign Affairs Committee, at which MPs concluded he was an unsatisfactory witness who had changed his story.

The transcript of this evidence has not been published after a personal request from Gavyn Davies, the BBC Chairman. But it is understood to show Mr Gilligan admitting he had only “inferred” Mr Campbell’s responsibility for inserting the 45-minutes claim into the dossier.

The BBC will seek to convince Lord Hutton that its journalists have told the truth by citing a number of “eliptical and evasive” answers by Dr Kelly in his Foreign Affairs Committee evidence. The implication will be that the scientist was misleading Parliament when he denied being behind the allegations.

The BBC’s confidence in its case is also based on a belief that, despite his evidence to MPs, he was a credible “intelligence source” — in the broadest sense — who had been in a position to make these allegations. In recent days newspaper reports have suggested that Dr Kelly was far more than just a middle-ranking “technical” adviser to the MoD. It is claimed he was the Government’s leading expert on Iraq’s WMD, a key figure who had access to intelligence material and all the drafts of the September dossier.

The MoD

THE Ministry of Defence’s case in the Hutton inquiry will focus on two key issues: how the policy on confirming David Kelly’s identity was agreed, and how significant a role the scientist played in producing the dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, sought advice from Sir Kevin Tebbit, the MoD’s Permanent Secretary, in formulating the policy on bringing Dr Kelly’s name into the public domain.

But on what grounds did Mr Hoon and Sir Kevin decide to provide background information about Dr Kelly’s career to any journalists seeking to discover which MoD civil servant had confessed to being the likely source for the BBC Today programme’s report alleging that the Government had “sexed up” the September dossier? If Mr Hoon was convinced that Dr Kelly’s name would emerge with or without MoD help, why did he believe it was right to assist journalists to pin down his name? A number of key pointers were divulged by senior members of the MoD’s press office.

An outline of Dr Kelly’s contribution to the dossier will also resolve one of the biggest questions: was he more closely involved in its production, and more intimately engaged with the intelligence services, than the MoD has suggested? While Dr Kelly was an expert in biological and chemical warfare, especially the former, he was not the only specialist in this field. Most of the MoD’s experts in weapons of mass destruction work for the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS).

MI6, which provided the intelligence about Iraq’s ability to prepare chemical and biological weapons for launching in 45 minutes, has some of its own specialists, but would normally rely on, and work with, the DIS. Dr Kelly worked for the MoD’s proliferation and arms control department, not the DIS. The 45-minute issue has generated more confusion than any other piece of intelligence. What MI6’s Iraqi military contact is believed to have imparted was that under a command and control system, modelled on Soviet doctrine, it would take 45 minutes to fire a chemical munition, such as an artillery shell, following authorisation from Baghdad. But for that to be realistic, the launching system would have already to be armed with its chemical warhead; in other words, ready and primed to fire.

The problem for the MoD and for the Government is that the specific intelligence about the 45 minutes has become lost in the arguments over whether this piece of information was given excessive prominence in the September dossier. In his foreword to the dossier, Tony Blair said that the weapons could be “ready” in 45 minutes, whereas the section in the report dealing with Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons used the word “deploy”. As one defence source said: “These words mean different things to different people.”

Explore UK News

• Crime News

• Education News

• Health News

• Scotland News

Times Recommends

• Times Christmas appeal: Letter from the Editor
• Conferences — what a waste of money
• Schools supremo learns a painful lesson