MESSAGES sent by three of Tony Blair’s closest aides threatened to blow a hole yesterday in Downing Street’s insistence that it had not “sexed up” last September’s Iraq weapons dossier, nor “turned the screw” on David Kelly.
The Hutton inquiry also heard details yesterday of Mr Blair’s personal involvement — and that of his advisers — in key decisions over the handling of Dr Kelly after he had come forward to admit meeting the BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan.
But it was the disclosure of three e-mails sent by Downing Street staff. including one that talks of a “game of chicken with the Beeb”, that will cause the greatest controversy. The first appears to show Alastair Campbell promising a “substantial rewrite” of the intelligence dossier on September 5, shortly after Mr Blair decided to go ahead with publication.
Jonathan Powell, Downing Street’s chief of staff, is recorded as having asked him: “What did you decide on dossiers?” This is thought to be reference to Iraq Communications Group of which Mr Campbell had chaired a meeting that day.
Mr Campbell replied: “Re dossier, substantial rewrite with JS and Julian M in charge, which JS will take to US next Friday, and be in shape Monday thereafter.
“Structure as per TB’s discussion. Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation.” “JS” is said to be a reference to John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, while Julian M is likely to be Julian Miller, the chief of the assessment staff at the Cabinet Office.
The inquiry has already heard that a draft of the document at this time did not include information that Iraq could deploy WMD within 45 minutes — which the BBC alleges was inserted by Mr Campbell. Mr Miller told Lord Hutton last week that this draft was an incomplete document which did not include new intelligence and had not been sent to the JIC.
The second Downing Street message disclosed at the inquiry yesterday was from Mr Powell to Mr Scarlett, with copies to Mr Campbell and Sir David Manning, who was then the Prime Minister’s foreign policy adviser. This e-mail was sent on September 17, just seven days before the dossier was published and within the timeframe to match BBC claims that the dossier was “sexed up” in the final week. “The dossier,” Mr Powell says, is good and convincing for those who are prepared to be convinced. (But it) does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam. We will need to make it clear in launching the document that we do not claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat.”
In his foreword to the September dossier, Mr Blair does not refer to an “imminent” threat but one which is “serious and current”. Although the distinction may not be immediately apparent, ministers have previously pointed out that they never used the word “imminent”.
Another potential problem for the Government may be that the inquiry has already seen a draft version of the dossier on September 16 which stated only that Iraq “may” be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes.
The language in the final version on September 24, was stronger, saying: “The Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.” Mr Miller has told the inquiry that such changes were agreed within the intelligence community before publication. Further evidence on the drafting of the dossier is expected to be taken today when Mr Campbell appears as a witness at the inquiry. Anti-war protestors plan to greet his arrival with placards saying: “You will need more than 45 minutes to spin your way out of this one.” However, there will also be embarrassment within Downing Street over yesterday’s disclosure of a third e-mail sent by Tom Kelly, one of the Prime Minister’s official spokesmen.
This message was sent to Mr Powell on July 10, the same day that newspapers named Dr Kelly as the likely source of the BBC’s allegations.
He wrote: “This is now a game of chicken with the Beeb.” Mr Kelly suggested in the e-mail that the BBC might climb down only “if they see the screw tightening”.
James Dingemans, QC, counsel to the inquiry, asked Mr Powell: “Was Dr Kelly really in the game of chicken as playing or played with?” Mr Powell answered that he did not think the e-mail was referring to Dr Kelly, but was about attempting to give the BBC an opportunity to “climb down” in a “dignified way”. He added: “We were locked in confrontation and there was no way the BBC could gracefully climb out.”
Mr Dingemans asked Mr Powell: “What was the atmosphere in Downing Street?” Mr Powell replied: “It was now a situation where people were perceiving that the BBC were going to have to cave in.” Much of yesterday’s evidence to the inquiry was about how this gathering storm developed around Downing Street and the involvement of the Prime Minister’s aides in disclosing Dr Kelly’s name.
On Thursday July 3, Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, telephoned Mr Powell to say that an MoD official had admitted speaking to Mr Gilligan.
The following day, the first of several high-powered meetings took place as Mr Powell discussed the problem with Sir David Manning, the Prime Minister’s foreign affairs and defence adviser, Sir David Omand, the Cabinet Office intelligence and security co-ordinator, and Mr Scarlett. Mr Blair received a fax at Chequers about the outcome.
On Saturday July 5, Mr Campbell telephoned Mr Powell, who was climbing in Wales, to discuss whether to tell the Foreign Affairs Committee, about to publish the results of its inquiry into Mr Gilligan's story, that a possible mole had been identified. On Monday, the Prime Minister wanted to know what Dr Kelly's views were on “weapons of mass destruction" and what he would tell the Commons committees investigating the issue. Dr Kelly was then summoned back from an RAF base in East Anglia and warned by his superiors that his name might be made public.
The Prime Minister was then told that Dr Kelly did not expect to remain anonymous. Sir Kevin Tebbit, the top civil servant at the MoD, brought to Downing Street a draft version of a press release about the possible mole coming forward. A new version was typed out at a meeting with Mr Campbell and the Prime Minister's spokesmen Godric Smith and Mr Kelly.
It also became clear that senior government officials gave no thought to the “strain and burden” that could be imposed on Dr Kelly once it was decided that he should face the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, where he was subjected to questioning. Mr Powell told the inquiry that this “was not something that came to us”.
