Jean Charles de Menezes, an innocent Brazilian electrician, was shot dead because detectives mistook him for the failed July 21 suicide bomber Hussain Osman, who had tried to blow up a London tube train the previous day. The jury that today convicted the police force of mishandling the operation which ended in de Menezes's death heard a number of damaging new facts during the trial:

1) The control room which was running the surveillance operation on Osman was crowded and noisy.

2) There was confusion in the minds of the control room officers, the surveillance team and the firearms officers about what the strategy was, should anyone emerge from the building they were watching.

3) The spotter who was supposed to verify Osman's identity had gone to the toilet and was absent from his post when de Menezes left the block of flats in Scotia Road where both he and Osman lived.

Factfile: revelations from the de Menezes trial

Information about the police killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, on July 22, 2005, that has emerged during the trial

Multimedia

• Pictures: Jean Charles de Menezes

BACKGROUND

• Ian Blair survives no confidence vote

• Timeline: how de Menezes identity emerged

• Come quietly, Sir Ian – you’re banged to rights

• ‘It is my task to ensure that lessons are learnt’

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4) The surveillance team failed to stop or question people leaving the block of flats, which might have uncovered the mistake.

5) It took four hours to assemble an SO19 firearms team to assist the surveillance operation, by which time de Menezes had long since left the building

6) The police changed their minds several times whether de Menezes was Osman, codenamed Nettletip.

7) The surveillance team asked repeatedly whether they should arrest de Menezes, as he was allowed to make two bus journeys, but were told to hold back and wait for the firearms team to handle the arrest.

8) The surveillance team reported that de Menezes appeared nervous and agitated, getting on and off the bus, sending text messages and making mobile phone calls. Officer interpreted this as someone potentially intent on causing an explosion.

9) The firearms team was given an "inaccurate and unbalanced" briefing, telling them they were dealing with a suicide bomber.

10) By the time the firearms team had finally caught up with the surveillance team, it was too late to stop de Menezes before he entered Stockwell Tube station in South London.

11) Deputy Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick, the gold commander in the control room, never gave an order to shoot. The Operation Kratos "shoot-to-kill" procedures were never invoked, and no Kratos codeword was issued.

12) The decision to shoot was taken by SO19 firearms officers on the Tube platform, after de Menezes allegedly reacted in an "aggressive and threatening manner" on being challenged.

13) Passengers were still fleeing the Tube platform when the “extremely violent, extremely noisy and obviously distressing” killing was carried out.

14) De Menezes was shot seven times in the head and neck at close range with ultra-lethal hollowpoint ammunition, that had been issued to firearms officers for the first time only that morning.

15) Met Police firearms officers had been trained by Israeli security experts on how to deal with suicide bombers.

16) A post-mortem examination found substances in de Menezes's urine that suggested he had recently taken cocaine; and there was a fake stamp in his passport.

17) The police later digitally doctored a photo intended to show the facial resemblance between de Menezes and Osman, to make them look more similar.

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