Scotland Yard was criticised by the trial judge yesterday for adopting “an entrenched position” and refusing to recognise any of its failures in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes.

Mr Justice Henriques said that the Met had disputed “every single failure” of 19 breaches of public safety laws alleged by the Crown in the Stockwell shooting trial. He added: “Some of the failures have been simply beyond explanation.” Had there been some admissions by the police, the judge suggested, the cost of the trial to the Met might have been considerably less.

The breaches of health and safety legislation detailed to the Old Bailey by the prosecution counsel Clare Montgomery, QC, were:

1. A failure adequately to communicate Commander John McDowall’s strategy to the officers who took over the operation on July 22
Mr McDowall, deputy head of counter-terrorism at the Yard, wanted a surveillance presence and a firearms capability at Scotia Road, Tulse Hill — the address connected with two of the 21/7 bombers and, coincidentally, with de Menezes. But there was “obvious confusion from the outset” between surveillance and other teams.

Factfile: revelations from the de Menezes trial

Information about the police killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, on July 22, 2005, that has emerged during the trial

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• Pictures: Jean Charles de Menezes

BACKGROUND

• Ian Blair survives no confidence vote

• Timeline: how de Menezes identity emerged

• Come quietly, Sir Ian – you’re banged to rights

• ‘It is my task to ensure that lessons are learnt’

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Related Links

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• Will Sir Ian take the blame?

• ‘It is my task to ensure that lessons are learnt’

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• Pictures: the de Menezes case

2. A failure adequately to plan for or carry out Mr McDowall’s strategy for controlling the premises.

3. The control room officers, the firearms officers and the surveillance officers had a confused and inconsistent understanding of what the strategy was for Scotia Road.
The different units had different understandings of what “containment” of the address meant.

4. There was a failure to deploy officers to stop and question persons emerging from the premises in Scotia Road.Mr McDowall envisaged that every person leaving the building would be stopped. That never happened.

5. There was a failure to ensure that an SO19 firearms team was in attendance at Scotia Road when Mr de Menezes emerged from the communal doorway.
Miss Montgomery said that the failure of the firearms unit to arrive at the target address was “simply inexplicable”. Although the orders were given at 4.55am, the unit reported for duty at 7am and even then “the pace was nearly funereal”.

6. There was a failure to have a contingency plan for dealing with persons who emerged from the flats before SO19 arrived.
All that stood in the way of a possible suicide bomber leaving the address was a surveillance team, not trained in intercepting terrorists.

7. There was a failure to stop and question persons emerging from the Scotia Road premises.

8. There was a failure to identify a safe and appropriate area where those leaving Scotia Road could be stopped and questioned.

9. The briefings given to firearms officers at Leman Street and Nightingale Lane police stations were inaccurate and unbalanced.
The firearms teams were told they would almost certainly be confronting suicide bombers, were issued with dum-dum bullets and told they would have to use “unusual tactics”.

10. Information on identifying Mr de Menezes, his clothing and likely level of threat was not properly or accurately assessed or disseminated.
No one seemed to think it significant that, unlike the 21/7 bombers, he was not carrying a rucksack.

11. There was a failure to ensure that doubts about the correctness of the identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect were communicated to the relevant officers in the control room at New Scotland Yard.

12. The control room officers failed to satisfy themselves that a positive identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect had been made by the surveillance officers.
The senior officers in the control room decided that Mr de Menezes was Osman, although no officer on the street had got to that conclusion.

13. There was a failure to deploy firearms officers at relevant locations in time to stop Mr de Menezes getting on to a bus and entering Stockwell Tube Station.

14. The firearms officers failed to satisfy themselves that a positive identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect had been made by the surveillance officers.

15. There was a failure to take effective steps to stop Tube trains or the buses or take other steps in traffic management to reduce the risk to the travelling public.

16. Although suspected of being the suicide bomber, Mr de Menezes was twice permitted to get on to a bus and to enter Stockwell Underground station.
If de Menezes had been a suicide bomber then the ordinary Londoners who were on the bus, in the Tube station and in his carriage were at risk because of the delayed deployment of the firearms team.

17. There was a failure to give a clear or timely order that Mr de Menezes be stopped or arrested before he entered Stockwell Tube Station.

Miss Montgomery said the final orders from the control room came “too late” because Mr de Menezes and the surveillance officers were underground.

18. There was a failure to give accurate information to Commander Cressida Dick as to the whereabouts of SO19 when she was deciding whether S019 \ or SO12 \ should stop Mr de Menezes.

19. There was a failure to minimise the risk inherent in effecting the arrest of Mr de Menezes by armed officers in relation to the location, timing or manner of his arrest.

An order should have been given for the firearms team to make the arrest without warning — reducing any chance of the suspected suicide bomber triggering his device.

July 22, 2005

4.20am Commander John McDowall is told that a rucksack with Hussain Osman’s gym card has been found. Address is Scotia Road, Tulse Hill, South London

4.55 Mr McDowall orders operation at Scotia Road with surveillance and firearms units 5.15 Red surveillance team leader is briefed

6.04 Red team begins watching Scotia Road

7.00 Firearms team assembles at Leman Street, East London, two hours after deployment requested

7.15 Mr McDowall briefs Commander Cressida Dick, who takes over as Gold Command

8.00 Grey surveillance team briefed

8.55 Grey team arrives to provide back-up for Red

9.15 Firearms team still at Leman Street for briefing

9.33 De Menezes leaves Scotia Road. One officer was relieving himself, did not get a clear look and asked for a second opinion. Red team asks Grey to follow

9.36 De Menezes walks up Upper Tulse Hill; is identified as a possible match with Osman by Grey team

9.39 De Menezes gets on No. 2 bus towards Brixton. Grey team cannot say for sure he is Osman

9.47 De Menezes alights from bus at Brixton Tube station

9.52 Reboards because the station is closed for a security alert

10.02 Gets off at Stockwell Road. Grey team asks control room if they should detain him before he enters Tube. They are told to wait

10.03 Ms Dick states: “Cannot let him down the Tube.” De Menezes walks into station

10.04 Ms Dick orders: “Must be challenged before getting down the Tube” but insists firearms team must perform the “stop”. De Menezes walks down escalator

10.05 Surveillance teams ordered to intercept. Seconds later firearms officers arrive and are ordered to conduct armed intervention. Surveillance officers are told not to intervene

10.08 De Menezes is shot dead

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