THE Russian master of the CEC Future was well aware of its vulnerability to attack as he steered the vessel through pirate-infested waters off the coast of Somalia. The Danish-owned ship lay low in the water with a cargo of steel.

At 1.41pm on Friday November 7 last year, the master pressed the emergency button on the bridge, signalling that pirates were approaching. He made contact with naval forces in the area then, as instructed, manoeuvred the ship to create waves in an attempt to hamper the pirates’ approach.

It was futile. Within 15 minutes men armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenade launchers had seized control. The crew were held at gunpoint.

“It seemed ridiculous in 2008 to have a ship taken by pirates,” said Per Gullestrup, chief executive of Clipper Projects and the first shipowner to speak on the record about the recent surge in attacks.

Not so ridiculous. This year there have already been 60 attacks in the Gulf of Aden, 31 of them off Somalia’s coast. On the 23 ships seized in the same area as the CEC Future, 397 crew were taken hostage.

Gullestrup, 53, is in London for a European conference on maritime piracy tomorrow, convened by the Rand Europe think tank and the Norton Rose law firm. It will focus on the need for political will, legal clarity and military capability to combat piracy.

Gullestrup, who had been a shipping apprentice at 15, knew his first task was to contact the families of the 13 crew - 11 Russians, one Georgian and one Estonian - to ensure they heard the news from him rather than media reports. He sent a taskforce to St Petersburg to tell the families that release might take several months but the hijackers were interested in money and were unlikely to harm the crew.

He telephoned the insurers of the vessel and its contents for advice. “Then they left us alone. You can’t have too many chefs in the kitchen.”

To keep negotiations at arm’s length and to avoid being “emotionally hijacked”, Clipper Projects used an intermediary to communicate with the pirates. It took Gullestrup four attempts to engage a professional negotiator – the first three were already busy with hostage crises in Colombia, Mexico and Afghanistan.

He did not expect to hear from the ship until it was anchored and he knew it would probably be taken to the port of Eyl, a pirate haven. Sure enough, the pirates made their first contact three days later on the Monday, demanding a $7m (£4.8m) ransom for the crew and the ship.

“We were prepared for a silly number and we knew it was going to take time,” Gullestrup said. “We decided we weren’t going to rush into negotiations. If we seemed too eager it would be perceived as weakness. We knew we would have to go through hoops but we were determined to remain firm.” They countered with a low number - $300,000.

By Thursday the pirates were becoming agitated. Their liaison, “Mr Ali”, probably a freelancer hired for his fluent English, sent a fax threatening to run the ship aground if they did not receive a response in two to three hours.

This attempt to increase pressure was counterproductive, according to Gullestrup: “It actually put them in a weaker position. The value to the pirates is not the ship or the cargo but the crew. The ransom, which generally ranges between $1m and $2m, is paid regardless of what cargo the ship is carrying.”

Despite the pirates’ fury, Gullestrup refused to move. The pirates dropped their demand to $5m over the weekend and negotiations assumed the modalities of a conventional business transaction - exactly what it was for the pirates.

For the company, the main objective was to secure the release of the crew. “The pirates knew very well that they could not harm the crew. If they did, it would change the dynamics and shoot their business plan to hell,” said Gullestrup.

“Our concern was the potential psychological trauma the crew might suffer by being held at gunpoint. We knew their lives were not in danger and this was confirmed by the crew after their debriefing.”

For three weeks there was silence. Then the pirates pulled a cruel stunt, telephoning to say that one of the crew had suffered a heart attack. Gullestrup had to decide whether it was a genuine call.

Through his intermediary, he told them to contact a radio-medic on stand-by in St Petersburg who would talk them through what needed to be done. Then he learnt that at the precise time cited for the heart attack, the crew member had been talking to his wife.

“We considered the pirates had blinked,” said Gullestrup, “and from the negotiation point of view we had established the firmer position.” They reestablished contact but the deadlock over the $5m ransom remained.

The crew spent Christmas in captivity. On January 2 Gullestrup was at home with his wife when his mobile rang at 9pm. The call was from Somalia. Mentally prepared after 60 days, Gullestrup answered.

“Mr Ali” introduced himself.

“He was very courteous and well spoken, but I told him I was surprised he had called. My position, I said, was no different from that of the intermediaries. Unless there was a breakthrough, I didn’t want to talk. If there was a breakthrough, then we needed to establish some base rules. In the meantime he shouldn’t waste my time and neither of us should insult the other’s intelligence.”

Three conditions were set when the men spoke the next day: first, Clipper Projects needed proof the crew were in good condition; second, the ransom money should be dropped by air rather than delivered by tugboat; third, the vessel should have enough fuel to reach a safe port, Salala, in Oman.

Just after midnight on January 12 “Mr Ali” called again. He wanted to cut out the intermediaries and negotiate a settlement directly. The crew, they agreed, would be lined up on the deck, the captain would confirm there was enough fuel and the money would be parachuted into the sea in a container.

There was an additional hazard. Consignments of khat, a stimulant with effects similar to amphetamine that has been chewed for centuries by local people, were being delivered to the pirates each day. As a result, some would go without sleep for three or four days. Not only were they likely to be psychologically unstable, but the crew might be vulnerable to inter-clan conflicts among the hostage takers.

These concerns proved well founded. When the money was dropped an argument broke out between the 30 or so pirates. It took 30 hours locked in the captain’s cabin to divide the money. The fighting left traces of blood all over the vessel.

In another twist, most of the pirates headed for Eyl but another dozen asked for a lift 10 hours up the coast. “We had to act like a taxi service,” said Gullestrup, “but then you don’t argue with men holding Kalashnikovs. The remaining pirates didn’t want to go ashore at Eyl because it’s enemy territory.”

Later “Mr Ali” rang to say that after the second batch of pirates had been dropped off,a fire-fight had broken out on the beach and the leader had been killed. Another died a few days later from his wounds.

Gullestrup does not believe the pirates are driven by ideological motives, as some claim. Their motive is money, pure and simple, he believes. It seems a percentage of the ransom goes to the Puntland and Somaliland government. Apart from the ransom, it cost the company $1.5m in expenses and lost income.

“Mr Ali” said pirates held workshops to exchange information. Gullestrup will tell the conference that shipowners should do the same. A German-owned cargo vessel, the MV Patriot, was seized by pirates yesterday in the Gulf of Aden, said naval patrols.

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