WHEN the long-anticipated fight against Iraq begins, it may not last long. A reasonably optimistic timeline might look like this: simultaneous airstrikes, Shia revolts and manoeuvres of the coalition ground force on the first day; by Day Four, substantial allied ground forces are near Baghdad; by Day Seven the defences around the capital have fallen; by Day 14 most organised resistance has been defeated, except for isolated elements in the city.

For the worldwide television audience, most of the action scenes may be over within a week and a half. Long columns of dusty armoured forces will have moved hundreds of miles into Iraq; daring air assaults and night operations to neutralise airfields will have been completed; the amazing precision airstrikes will be over; a few vicious firefights will be followed by endless scenes of surrendering Iraqi soldiers; and rooting out the last-ditch resistance . . . well, it won’t be nearly as visual even if it takes a few more days.

But war is the most unpredictable of human activities. British soldiers moving to the front in the glorious days of August 1914 could not have imagined the endless trench warfare to follow. And American GIs in Korea, thrilled by the rapid collapse of North Korean forces after the landings at Inchon, dreamt that they would be home by Christmas 1950, yet the war lasted almost three more years. And then there was Vietnam ...

So what could drag out the fight in Iraq? If US forces do not deploy through Turkey, this may add a few days of movement time. Or maybe Saddam’s forces will strike us in the staging areas in Kuwait before we kick off. Saddam does have chemical and biological weapons that he will attempt to use. If we got hit before we were ready ... well, we better be ready.

Much of the Iraqi civilian population, Kurds and Shia, may be targeted by Saddam. They have no protection and if he were to strike them with weapons of mass destruction, the toll could be in the tens of thousands or more. Doing all we could to alleviate the suffering, we would be delayed.

Saddam could cling desperately to the larger cities, especially Baghdad, and use civilians as human shields. If he relies on his most loyal forces, if their will is not broken and if they succeed in eliminating any insurrections inside the city, he may delay our advance by a few days and even drag out the urban fight for an additional week or two, for we will certainly do our best to minimise casualties and suffering among the civilian population.

But let’s be clear: Saddam is isolated geographically and diplomatically. Fanatical popular resistance to the US and its allies is highly improbable, based on all readings of the populace in Iraq. And once the war begins, there will be no help coming from the outside. Further, despite the threats of terrorist strikes elsewhere, the US and its allies will press the fight relentlessly.

Militarily, this war shapes up as a total mismatch in our favour — and that is the way any force wants to fight. Saddam’s forces are less than half as capable today as in 1991, while we have new reconnaissance means, communications and precision-strike technologies. Nowhere is American military technology better suited to overwhelm an opponent than in the arid, open spaces of the Middle East. And we have a high regard for the skills of our British allies, too.

Conservatively, we may be two or three times more effective than we were in 1991. Our military leadership is superb and we are better prepared than ever before for the “dirty battlefield” of chemical and biological weapons. Our training and technology for urban combat — along with some help from the Iraqi population itself — should enable us to finish off any “Stalingrad on the Tigris”.

But we must not call a halt too soon. If this war ends only when we achieve its aim — eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction — we are talking of several weeks more, and maybe several months.

By all reports, we do not know precisely where all the weapons, manufacturing sites, technologies and scientists are located. This will require investigation on the ground; interrogation of enemy forces; exploitation of captured documents; and lots of searches by experts, after the fighting has stopped.

And if we are looking for the end of the terrorist threat, then we have to recognise that Iraq is but a battle in a larger campaign. After we’ve deposed Saddam and worked to install a new government, we’ll all have to ask: has taking down Saddam brought us closer to our goal? And now what is next?

• General Clark was Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1997-2000 and led Nato forces during the Kosovo campaign.
  
  What Iraq can expect
  
  

• Previous allied campaigns:

• Gulf War 1991: 42 days Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait after a 38-day air and four-day ground campaign
  
  
• Bosnia, 1995: 17 days After four years of conflict in Yugoslavia following Serbian rejection of independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nato bombing ended when warring factions agreed to cease all offensive operations in Sarajevo and remove heavy weapons
  
  
• Kosovo, 1999: 78 days Nato bombing ceased when Serbian Army and police forces evacuated the province
  
  
• Afghanistan, 2001: 76 days The sustained bombing that began in October 2001 was eased after 2½ months. US-led operations continue, the most recent being in villages south of Khost and Gardez.

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