DIPLOMACY failed. Tony Blair sent John Prescott out from 10 Downing street in the late afternoon chill to tell us what was already all too clear. There would be no new United Nations resolution; the United States and Britain were about to launch into war in the face of world opposition.

Yesterday in Washington, mixed with the adrenalin of the eve of battle, there was shocked bewilderment that the drive for a consensus had gone so wrong. Britain’s Ambassador to the UN blamed France and, in the simplest sense, that is true; its threatened veto was the single greatest factor bringing diplomacy to a halt.

But in the chronicle of this failure, the US made serious mistakes — avoidable ones — over an entire year. It is hard not to conclude that it could have had the war it wanted, and world backing too, if it had played its hand just a bit better.



Axis of evil

In listing the worst American misjudgments, we might as well begin with President Bush’s denouncement of the Axis of Evil in January 2002. In equating Iraq with North Korea and Iran, states with more sophisticated nuclear programmes, Bush undermined one reason for attack.

In the past month, as North Korea has stepped up apparent preparations for building nuclear weapons, and as the scale of Iran’s nuclear programme has become clear, the perception that Bush is “doing” Iraq just because it is do-able has eroded support, within the US and outside.



Mid-East morass

To say America’s policy on the Middle East was muddled last spring is an understatement. Despite Blair’s exhortation, the US remained reluctant to get involved, determined to ringfence the problem from Iraq. This cost it support in Europe and the region.



“Regime Change”

When talk of Iraq surfaced in August last year, “regime change” was the goal. This phrase, the Administration insisted, simply reflected longstanding policy. Put that baldly, however, it is not easily reconciled with UN principles.



Lukewarm courtship of UN

Under the urging of Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, and Bush’s father’s former advisers, the Administration half-heartedly began exploring whether it could get UN support for military action. But in openly regarding Iraq’s admission of weapons inspectors with frustration, the US left the impression from the start that it wanted war at all costs.



Changing goals

As the US courted the UN, it offered a cascade of different reasons for attack.

“Regime change” promptly vanished, to be replaced with disarmament, then the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, then (very recently) the democratisation of the Arab world.

This backfired. It created mistrust among potential allies, while it helped Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, in scaring Arab countries that the US would not stop at Iraq.



Military buildup

The military buildup complicated the diplomacy. For a start, its timetable was more urgent than that of Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector. Although it clearly put pressure on Iraq to co-operate with Blix, it began to lock the US on to the path of war, for fear of the humiliation of bringing the soldiers back home.



Misjudging France

It is now clear that the US misjudged the French reaction; until just over a week ago, it thought France might tolerate its plans, if not endorse them.

It had some cause for misunderstanding. France had, after all, signed up to Resolution 1441 in November; Powell thought he had given the clear message that France shouldn’t back that one if it wouldn’t back war. France, too, was preparing ships and aircraft for a possible military role.

But the US underestimated anti-American feeling in Europe. Powell’s widely-cited reluctance to travel may have played a part; it gave other governments the sense that the Bush team would not go the extra mile, and also shielded the Administration for too long from that discontent.

But the real diplomatic failure centres on the past few weeks. Late in the day, after Washington had lost patience, France made repeated small concessions over the time it wanted the inspectors to be given. Both British and US diplomats appear to have misjudged this; recriminations in New York centre on what might have been salvaged had this been apparent earlier.



Misjudging Russia

Russia was more circumspect than France in its opposition, but its position amounted to much the same in the end. The US underestimated the irritation in Russia about a string of snubs by the Bush Administration, particularly the unilateral exit from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.



Misjudging Turkey

A late, serious snub to the US, provoked partly by the clear assumption in parts of the Administration that Turkey’s support could be bought.



One final mistake

As the US heads into war, it cannot congratulate itself that the Arab “street” has been quiet — quieter than the European street, come to that. This is better explained by lack of organisation of the anti-American movement, or lack of freedom to protest, not lack of feeling. It hardly represents a diplomatic triumph.

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