THE suicide bombings in Riyadh this week, bearing the hallmarks of an al-Qaeda operation, appear to rebut American assertions that al-Qaeda is “on the run” and that the counter-terrorism coalition has “turned the corner” in the War on Terror. Al-Qaeda remains a potent, formidable force. That said, its post-September 11 incarnation is qualitatively different from the pre-September 11 entity.

US-led military action in Afghanistan and the continued allied military presence there released the Taleban’s grip and deprived Osama bin Laden, his inner circle and hundreds of rank-and-file members of a friendly host, a recruiting “magnet” and a comfortable base for training and operations. The campaign also killed some leaders, including the military planner Mohammed Atef, forced others further underground and hobbled them operationally.

The world-wide intelligence and law-enforcement mobilisation has made communications, travel and financing more difficult. US officials say that more than 3,000 suspected al-Qaeda operatives have been arrested, including key figures such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the third-in-command. However, the counter-terrorism effort has also impelled an already highly decentralised and elusive transnational terrorist network to become more “virtual” and therefore even harder to identify and neutralise. If, offensively, al-Qaeda has been hobbled since the Afghan intervention, from a defensive point of view it is better off.

The group’s greatest advantage is the logistical and operational flexibility afforded because it has no state to defend. This allows it to maintain a transnational and clandestine organisational scheme with minimal dedicated physical infrastructure.

Al-Qaeda is present in more than 60 countries. Intelligence agencies estimate that at least 20,000 jihadis have been trained in its Afghan camps since 1996. Since September 11, 2001, military and law-enforcement efforts have resulted in the deaths or permanent detention of perhaps one third of al-Qaeda’s 30 senior leaders and no more than 2,000 rank-and-file members. This leaves a rump leadership intact and more than 18,000 potential terrorists still at large, with recruitment continuing and probably increasing in the wake of war in Iraq.

Al-Qaeda’s cells still appear to operate semi-autonomously, maintaining links through field commanders to bin Laden and his shura (council), which can activate networks and give operational orders. Al-Qaeda members have also cut the use of electronically traceable telecommunications equipment.

Now without a physical target to focus on, the US and its counterterrorism partners have few effective military options available to thwart al-Qaeda. They must depend instead on homeland security, lawenforcement and intelligence co-operation. This has proven effective where mature governments, robust security institutions and long-standing bilateral relationships prevail: there have been a number of major terrorist arrests and no major attacks in Europe or the US.

But where security institutions are weak or constrained by anti-American or anti-Western sentiment, as in Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, the vulnerabilities are easier to exploit.

Yet al-Qaeda’s relative offensive weakness and curtailed freedom of action do not mean that the group has permanently scaled back its level of violence or limited its agenda. The US military presence in Saudi Arabia and American support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are cited in recent al-Qaeda videotapes aired on al-Jazeera as justifications for its terrorism.

Now, as suggested by al-Qaeda’s renewed focus on the Gulf, the US’s aggressive intervention in Iraq and its enlarged military footprint in the Arab world have added to al-Qaeda’s list of grievances.

Also frequently referred to in al-Qaeda rhetoric is the alleged historical humiliation of Islam at the hands of the Judaeo-Christian West. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, al-Qaeda’s spokesman, has said that there can be no truce until it has killed four million Americans, whereupon others could convert to Islam.

Thus, the US remains al-Qaeda’s prime target, and measures to draw down American military deployment in Saudi Arabia and constructive US involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alone would not defuse al-Qaeda’s overriding intention of debilitating the US. Unlike “old” ethno-nationalist or ideological terrorist groups, al-Qaeda’s complaints have been transformed into religious absolutes and cannot be tamed through political compromise or conflict resolution. Counter-terrorist measures are required. There is a premium on intergovernmental co-operation. But only more sustained and nuanced diplomatic initiatives can eliminate the root causes of Islamic terrorism.

The US and its counter-terrorism partners, then, still have their hands full. Al-Qaeda must now rely more on local groups that it may have only loose affiliations with. Consequently, bin Laden and his lieutenants are compelled to relinquish substantial operational initiative and responsibility. Nevertheless, experienced al-Qaeda operatives and “middle managers” are in sufficient abundance to provide planning and logistical advice, materiel and perhaps financing. This they are likely to have done with respect to the Bali bombing and the Mombasa attacks as well as the Riyadh operation. While these were not mass-casualty attacks of the order of September 11 and did not generate its symbolic power, they still killed Americans, Europeans and Israelis and managed to palsy the civilised world.

Al-Qaeda affiliates suspected of involvement in post-September 11 operations, Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria and al-Ittihaad al-Islamiya in East Africa, to name a few, probably have no direct operational links. Al-Qaeda, however, acts as their ideological and logistical hub, and bin Laden’s charisma, presumed survival and elusiveness enhance its attractiveness to terrorists. This means that al-Qaeda remains a terrorist “network of networks” with unparalleled leverage.

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