Bush must be wary of linking attack to al-Qaeda

DID President Bush’s War on Terror trigger the Bali bombing? Should Bush now take on Indonesian terrorism as part of his campaign? “No” is the best answer at this point, to both questions. The roots of terrorism were there already in South-East Asia. There is no need to suggest, as some have, that the Bali devastation was provoked by the Afghan War, or the Bush Administration’s plans to bomb Iraq.

If only it were, in a sense. That would make it a much simpler problem, stemming from a small band of America-haters, with defined missions.

But the problem the Bali bombing gives Bush is that it shows that the War on Terror is not easily reduced to named villains, such as Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. For all the rush — in both Indonesia and Washington — to attribute the weekend’s bloodbath to those already on the Bush Administration’s hitlist, the attack illustrates the complexity and geographical range of the problem Bush has set himself.

Far from strengthening Bush’s War on Terror, the attack is likely to have made his campaign much more difficult.

No one has claimed responsibility for the blast (or an accompanying smaller blast, near an American consulate). There appears, at the moment, to be even less evidence than there is about the identity of the Washington sniper. So the past two days have inevitably been spent in a trawl of the usual suspects, in particular, al-Qaeda and a group often alleged to be linked to it, Jemaah Islamiyah.

This is not far-fetched. American intelligence has been giving warning since the early stages of the Afghan campaign that al-Qaeda terrorists, driven out of that hiding place, would spread out across South-East Asia. It is entirely plausible that they have linked up with radical Muslim groups in the region.

But the link is not proven yet. The blast was unlike almost every other case labelled terrorism where an al-Qaeda link was suspected, in that it targeted tourists (and so, if you like, the Indonesian economy). At this point, it is easier to call it an attack on Indonesian interests, even Australian ones, than on America. There have been other recent attacks across a troubled swath of the world, including Yemen and Kuwait, that have more of the appearance of a co-ordinated anti-American attack than does this.

All the same, it is no surprise that so many rushed to assert an al-Qaeda link. At the least, it would be convenient in many ways.

For the Indonesian Government, such a connection would not only secure American help in pursuing the bombers, but also would divert attention from whether the terrorists could have been attacking domestic changes, such as the independence of East Timor in May.

There are good reasons, too, why Washington might also welcome an al-Qaeda link. It would simplify the presentation of the War on Terror: a single enemy, albeit with many heads and many shelters. In that light, Bali would be simply the opening of another front in the War on Terror. That was the thrust of Bush’s comments in calling for the fight against the “global menace” of terrorism.

It was also an interpretation seized by many American commentators, who saw the blast immediately as an attack on American interests. In an extraordinary sequence of unjustified leaps, a Washington Post editorial also concluded: “The attacks are a sobering reminder that the war against terrorism is in its early stages, that more attacks against American interests and targets can be expected.” The newspaper has been rather cooler-headed in analysing its local threat of the sniper.

To try to tuck the Bali attack neatly under the already wide umbrella of the War on al-Qaeda is dangerous; it tries to pretend that the War on Terror is simple if lengthy campaign against easily named targets, and their clearly defined aims.

It glosses over the fact that terrorism across the region was in any case rising; the formation of militant Muslim groups predated September 11. Their aims have been far from easily summarised: a mixture of national and local grievances, a poorly articulated dream of an international Muslim network, plus, in pockets, a passing anti-Americanism, although without the passion of that found in the Middle East.

Yes, Indonesia could have done much more than it has done to crack down on these groups, many of whose leaders have long been identified. Its neighbouring governments did so years ago. But the unrest of Muslim radicals across that huge region is a sprawling problem, not helped by lumping it under the still clearly defined problem of al-Qaeda.

If Bush tries to force the Bali attack into the al-Qaeda mould, and the evidence does not quickly support it, he will undermine his own War on Terror. He will be asked to explain why American troops are not heading for Indonesia — perhaps in preference to Iraq. Yet he does not want to be seen to be rising to every provocation by every terrorist group — and this weekend unfortunately will not be the last.

If he is serious about defeating al-Qaeda, then his biggest problem is Pakistan. That problem has become tougher in the past week, with the strong gains made by fundamentalist parties in last week’s election.

Now that Islamic parties have won control of North West Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan, we should assume that hunting for Taleban fighters there has become impossible — and probably for al-Qaeda and bin Laden, too.

Bali presents Bush with twin temptations, both dangerous: to simplify the problems facing Indonesia by dubbing them “al-Qaeda”, and to ignore the problems the War on Terror already suffers, particularly in Pakistan.

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