Pakistani soldiers had dug into stone bunkers on a strategic mountaintop close
to the Afghan border. Helicopter gunships hovered over a village down in the
valley. The boom of artillery fire echoed in the distance as troops tried to
flush out suspected al-Qaeda fighters holed up in a mud compound.
Pointing his baton towards the hill on the horizon where his soldiers had
advanced, Major-General Niaz Khattak boasted: “It is only a matter of time
before the entire South Waziristan region will be cleared of terrorists.”
A short man with a thick, greying moustache, the commanding officer, a Pashtun
from the North West Frontier Province, was visibly pleased with his men as
he stood on the windy escarpment of Karwana Manzai, shortly after it was
captured from rebels.
This was November 2004, almost eight months after General Khattak, with more
than 7,000 troops, had started to hunt al-Qaeda fugitives in the lawless
tribal region in the largest operation since Pakistan threw its support
behind the US after 9/11. Despite some successes, General Khattak was
frustrated that there was no sign of the man that Pakistan’s American allies
really wanted him to catch: Osama bin Laden. “I have had no indications, no
intelligence of bin Laden’s whereabouts,” General Khattak declared.
Known as Pakistan’s Wild West, Waziristan had long been regarded as one of the
most likely hiding places for bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
This was the first time that Pakistani forces had set foot on the fiercely
autonomous territory. The 1,930 square mile (5,000sq km) swath was the
largest of seven tribal agencies on Pakistan’s western border with
Afghanistan. Inhabited by one million Pashtun tribesmen, Waziristan was a
land of high, difficult mountains and deep, rugged defiles, and had become a
significant troublespot for US and Afghan forces.
For more than two years al-Qaeda fugitives had moved freely in the border
areas. Clusters of towering mud compounds in a valley surrounded by rugged
mountains served as the world’s largest al-Qaeda command and control centre,
as well as a guerrilla training facility. Several hundred Uzbek, Chechen and
Arab militants lurked inside, training, recruiting and plotting attacks in
Pakistan and the West and operating a sophisticated propaganda factory,
complete with video-editing machines and CD burners.
At least 15 camps had operated under the protection of sympathetic tribesmen,
mostly around Wana and Shakai. In spring 2004, a week before the start of
General Khattak’s campaign, senior al-Qaeda leaders gathered there for a
“terror summit”. Among them was Abu Faraj al-Libbi, who would become bin
Laden’s top operational planner. Many operatives from other countries joined
them. At the top of the agenda were plans for attacks on the US and Britain.
General Khattak’s operation provoked intense anger among local tribesmen. The
deployment was made possible only after long negotiations with various
tribes, who reluctantly agreed to the military’s presence on the assurance
that it would bring funds and promote development work. The tribesmen of
South Waziristan. however, considered the military’s presence an attack on
their autonomy.
Attempts to persuade them to hand over foreign militants failed and the
Government offensive against suspected al-Qaeda fighters turned into an
undeclared war between the Pakistani military and rebel tribesmen.
Waziristan had been inhabited largely by two main Pashtun tribes, the
Waziris and the Mehsud, likened by Sir Olaf Caroe, a British scholar and
administrator, to panthers and wolves respectively. “Both are splendid
creatures, the panther is slyer, sleeker, and has more grace, the wolf pack
is more purposeful, more united and more dangerous”.
These two tribes and their numerous sub-groups co-existed in what could be
defined as “a state of chronic feud”. But they would unite against
outsiders. No foreign invaders, from Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan to
the British, had ever been able to control Waziristan. It was not only
ideological bonds and sympathy that helped al-Qaeda fugitives to buy the
support of the tribesmen, but also money. Bin Laden’s men distributed
millions of dollars among the tribal elders in return for shelter. Local
fighters, enlisted by al-Qaeda, received up to $250 (£127) each in monthly
wages, many times more than those of a government soldier.
Militant commanders would get advances for their services running into
millions. Residents also received huge sums by renting out their compounds
for shelter and training camps. Most of the al-Qaeda funds came through
illegal and informal channels from Arab countries.
When Pakistani security forces launched their offensive against the militants,
they boasted that the operation would be over in a couple of days. But the
intensity of the fighting shocked the Pakistani commanders. The Army
suffered heavy casualties in 12 days of bloody fighting. On March 16 at
least 50 soldiers were killed and many others captured by the tribesmen and
their foreign guests.
The fiercest battles took place in Kaloosha and Shin Warsak. Scores of troops,
finding themselves surrounded, threw away their weapons and fled. “Many
soldiers took shelter inside a mosque when they came under fire,” Ehsan
Wazir, a resident, told me. “Among them was a colonel who came out with the
Koran on his head begging for his life. He was let go after the tribesmen
stripped off his uniform.”
The Government could not abandon the operation so soon and had to use bombers
and helicopter gunships against what had earlier been described as a
“handful of foreign militants and some local miscreants”. In one attack,
militants ambushed an army caravan near Sarwakai village, massacring two
dozen soldiers and capturing several others. Not a single soldier in the
convoy escaped.
In the first couple of weeks the military lost more than 120 soldiers. Pashtun
troops deserted the government forces in droves; those who belonged to local
tribes refused to fire on their brethren. Some, perhaps, had also been
inspired by a videotape of al- Zawahiri calling President Musharraf a
traitor and urging Pakistani troops to disobey orders.
The tape also reinforced the suspicion that the al-Qaeda No 2 had been hiding
in the border areas and embarrassed General Musharraf who, just a few days
before, had claimed that his forces had encircled “a high-value target”. He
tried to play down al-Zawahiri’s ranting. “Zawahiri is on the run. For
heaven’s sake, it is just one tape. Let’s not get excited.”
Pakistani army commandos came very close to seizing al-Zawahiri in mid-2004
when they raided an al-Qaeda safe house in South Waziristan. The vast mud
compound contained a huge cache of weapons, radios and sophisticated
electronic equipment. Intelligence officials believed the place had been
used by al-Zawahiri but he had apparently fled.
In April 2004 the catastrophic failure of the Pakistani Army’s operation
forced the authorities to make a truce with the militants, who were led by a
young Waziri tribesman. Nek Mohammed, 27, emerged as a hero among the
tribesmen after his blistering attack forced troops to retreat. His fighters
eluded capture for six weeks and killed 120 government soldiers.
Lieutenant-General Safdar Hussein, the top army commander responsible for
anti-terrorism operations in northwestern Pakistan, flew into Shakai on
April 26 to sign a truce with Nek Mohammed. Amid much fanfare, the general
hugged and garlanded the rebel commander. He agreed to halt the army
operation against his militants, compensate the Wazir tribesmen for war
damages and free most of the 160 suspected al-Qaeda militants captured by
his forces.
Under the deal, Mohammed and other leaders were granted amnesties. They
promised not to attack government troops but they were not bound to hand
over foreign fighters. The militants also refused to give any commitment to
stop raids on the US and Afghan forces across the border.
The deal marked a temporary halt in the hunt for foreign militants in the
tribal areas. Pakistani authorities said the “reconciliation” was aimed at
weaning the tribesmen away from foreign militants or al-Qaeda. But Mohammed
and his supporters celebrated the truce as a victory for jihad.
Within days the agreement was in tatters, as militants launched attacks on
military posts. The army’s deadly response made things worse. Mounting
civilian casualties fuelled anger, even among those tribesmen who did not
support the militants.
The biggest success for the military came in June 2004 when Mohammed was
killed by a missile. His death brought a brief respite in the battle, but
the war was far from over. Nek Mohammed’s mud grave in Shakai became a
shrine, visited by scores of tribesmen every day. His supporters, led by
Abdullah Mehsud, targeted tribal chiefs who had collaborated with the
Pakistani military. One by one, all those who had backed military operations
against the militants were killed.
Faridullah Khan, a Waziri tribal elder and former senator, virtually signed
his own death warrant when, in March 2004, he facilitated the entry of army
troops to his home village, Shakai in South Waziristan. I saw Faridullah at
an army-sponsored tribal jirga there in April 2005. Escorted by armed
guards, Faridullah declared: “Al-Qaeda were all over the valley. But this
year they are on the run. Peace has been restored.”
Twenty-four hours later, he was dead, his Jeep blasted with rocket- propelled
grenades.
A day earlier General Khattak had declared that South Waziristan had been
cleared of foreign terrorists.
Waziristan: where tribal chieftains rule
- Waziristan is roughly half the size of Wales, with an estimated population of
a million
- The region has never been under full government control — during either
British or Pakistani rule. Instead, it is federally administered by
tribal chieftains, who are pacified through the payment of subsidies
- The rule of law is enforced through a centrally appointed political agent, who
can exercise absolute and arbitrary judicial power over tribesmen
- Until 1997 only a small number of maliks (tribal elders) were allowed to vote.
In the 2002 elections, after adult enfranchisement, a hardline Islamic
alliance gained the majority of votes
- A rebellion against British rule began in 1937 after troops helped a kidnapped
Hindu girl to escape her captors — a move that was considered a great
offence to the maliks
- Guerrilla fighting continued for more than a decade after independence in
1947, with local rulers condemning Pakistan as “un-Islamic"
- During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Waziristan was used to channel
funds and weapons to the Afghan jihad. At the same time Saudi Arabia
sponsored a network of madrassas, helping to cement radical Islam in the
region
- With little industry or infrastructure, the economy has for decades relied
heavily on smuggling, gun-running and drug-trafficking. Thousands of
tribesmen, most of whom receive little or no formal education, also find
employment in Islamic militia
Source: Frontline Pakistan, agencies
