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Other officials “habitually” concealed the truth about Iraq’s industrial and military capabilities from Saddam for fear of how he might react. When al-Majid was asked by investigators how people brought bad news to Saddam, he was at a loss to reply. He had apparently never known anyone to bring bad news to Saddam.

In the same vein, Qusay, Saddam’s son, used to exaggerate good information to please his father. He once told Saddam that Iraq’s forces were “10 times more powerful than in 1991” when, according to Huwaysh, they were “100 times weaker”.

It was not surprising that inside the palaces of Baghdad reality began to slip. A fog of uncertainty descended over the government, ultimately leaving ministers, let alone the West, uncertain about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or not.

At times Saddam liked to micro-manage everything and according to Huwaysh “intervened in all of his ministries when and where he saw fit”. On other occasions he would ponder key decisions for months but “share his thoughts with few advisers”.

He also failed to set ministers detailed goals. “He tended to let ideas float up and he would consider them — often never pronouncing on them one way or another,” says the report. Officials were left trying to guess how to proceed.

Such was the confusion that on one occasion some minions refused to believe that Saddam had reversed his policy on weapons inspections — when in fact he had done so.

Like many dictators Saddam sought to divide and rule, encouraging his staff to undermine each other. The informal command systems, where orders were often verbal and records were chaotic, encouraged a paranoid “gossip culture”, according to Taha Yassin Ramadan, a former vice-president.

Members of the regime vied to establish their own channels to Saddam, corroding trust and stabbing each other in the back. “He fostered competition and distrust among those around him”, says the report. This helped to protect him but “greatly coloured and contorted the perspectives of reality his top aides had”.

Every now and again he made all officials submit inventories of their assets and nobody was allowed to have more than certain “sufficient” levels. Officials who betrayed those who were concealing assets were rewarded with half of the hidden property.

It was almost impossible to tell what Saddam might do next. Sometimes staff might be severely punished or jailed for a transgression — and yet later, according to the report, “they would be released and Saddam might cook a meal for them himself”.

Even the revolutionary command council (RCC), supposedly one of the most important bodies of state, barely knew where it stood or what was really going on. The RCC, according to al-Majid, had voted to give Saddam alone the power to call RCC meetings and to make decisions in its name.

Sometimes notice of meetings was given “only hours or minutes” before they occurred. Ministers were picked up in official cars with blacked-out windows, driven off, switched into other cars and taken to a secret location.

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