Compared with India — and the comparison is becoming too cruel to make — it is doing just that. The US’s policy of backing Musharraf whatever he does — or more tellingly, doesn’t do — is looking ineffective to the point of danger.

This week the provincial government of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province said that it would pass a law to ensure Islamic correctness. Opposition parties denounced the “Talebanisation” of the wild province, which was never firmly under central control, but which has become more religious, conservative and independent since the 2001 Afghan war.

There is no need for too much alarm about the Bill itself. It is highly unlikely to become law. The governor, a representative of federal government, and the courts have a lot of power to stop it on the ground that it contradicts national law.

The Bill’s proponents know this. But local elections are imminent. The MMA, the coalition of religious conservatives that holds power, is pandering to the mullahs.

The MMA has tried similar moves before. It has banned music on buses (under a traffic law), barred male doctors from treating female patients and told men to stop coaching female athletes. But it has had only patchy success in enforcing these, as many blaring buses prove.

Daily life in Peshawar, the capital, has changed less than many feared under the MMA. Local resistance to “Talebanisation” makes the opposite point: that the province is very different to Afghanistan, for all the deep cultural links.

But there lies the rub. The province is still a source of great help to former Taleban, who move easily over the border, according to reports.

Hamid Karzai’s Government in Kabul has complained to Musharraf about the destabilising effect of this traffic on Afghanistan. But the Pashtun tribal links are proving stronger than orders from Islamabad. Could Musharraf do more? He says not. He argues that he is juggling modernisation with the need not to offend the Army or the MMA, also the largest opposition group in the national parliament.

The US — and to some extent, Britain — has bought this claim since September 11, 2001, with too much indulgence. “Better the devil you know” is the phrase they recite to suppress their concern.

Of course, Musharraf has a point when he defends his immobility. The Army remains his power base, but it is not one he can take for granted. Hierarchical and disciplined, it still seems respectful of his orders.

But the Army, even more than Pakistan in general, was passionately inspired by the long conflict with India over Kashmir. Musharraf has risked its support by persisting with peace talks with India, trying to wean his country off this totemic struggle.

The Army, which long supported the Taleban, also remains deeply sympathetic to its former ally and dislikes Musharraf’s closeness to Kabul.

These vulnerabilities highlight the central failure of Musharraf’s tenure — the lack of progress towards a healthy democracy. He has undermined the main political parties because they threatened his authority. Then he sidelined the parliament he himself created when fundamentalists won too great a role. He remains dependent on the Army for his authority — and afraid of keeping his repeated promise to step down as its head.

Looking back, his biggest mistake was in the North West Frontier Province itself. Before the last elections, his supporters did their best to undermine the People’s Party, one of the two old mainstream parties. That created the vacuum that let the religious parties rush in.

There are few angels in those old parties, which became a byword for corruption in their time in power. But Musharraf’s reluctance to let politics thrive is choking Pakistan’s evolution.

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