THE Iraqi general leant back and laughed so hard that his belly shook. General Jamal Ahmed was recounting Saddam Hussein’s visit to his war room, when all his generals knew that the Iraqi army would be beaten by the Americans but feared to contradict their leader’s insistence that they would prevail.

As commander of a 1,500-man brigade in a province that borders on Baghdad’s northern limits, Ahmed, 48, now has to listen to Iraq’s new leaders call for American troops to withdraw, knowing full well that the Iraqi army would again be overrun if they did.

“One hundred per cent we need the Americans in Iraq now,” Ahmed said last week in his office at the Taji base, 20 miles north of Baghdad. “The army can’t stand. We will be killed. We need training. Weapons. Equipment.”

Under Saddam he would have been executed had he spoken up, while in today’s Iraq he can expose hypocrisy without risking his neck. He laughed at the paradox that his mentor in the process of creating a fighting brigade is Colonel Stan Wilson, who fought against him in the war that toppled Saddam.

Wilson now heads a team preparing the Iraqi army to fight alone. Success is crucial to the American exit strategy, in which Iraqi forces will be substituted for US troops in a staged withdrawal.

Yet there are only 30 “transition teams” working in Iraq. They are embedded with Iraqi units, training them to fight a ferocious insurgency by al-Qaeda infiltrators and supporters of Saddam.

General George Casey, the top US commander in Iraq, has had to push back his timetable as the Iraqi forces failed to improve and the resistance grew bloodier. In June he told the White House that US forces could begin to withdraw by September. The Americans cut back patrols in Baghdad, but the spiral of violence forced them to return and Casey said recently that it would be 12 to 18 months before the Iraqi army was ready.

Even though the transition teams embedded with Iraqis are showing signs of success, they are treated like poor relations by the US command. Equipment and weapons go to combat units; Wilson’s Taji unit relies on Iraqi soldiers scavenging spare parts from a junk yard of destroyed tanks on the base.

There have been improvements. The first teams to embed were mostly reservists, guardsmen and retirees. They are now more experienced. Wilson has had 25 years in the army; his deputy, Major Ross O’Hara, has had 19 years in military intelligence.

Ahmed is in command while the Americans mentor and train. Several days a week, the two commanders go out on patrol together. The Americans do not give orders but try to nudge the Iraqis towards better tactics.

Tank deployment is an example of the differences. “The Iraqis put a tank at a checkpoint,” said O’Hara. “For us, that is a waste of a tank. It is a static position.”

Ahmed says his troops desperately need more equipment although he agrees with Wilson that it is too early to distribute rocket-propelled grenades. “Maybe some of the soldiers would use them against us. Maybe they would sell them,” Ahmed explained.

Desertions, absenteeism and lack of discipline are his main problems. “There’s no punishment if a soldier leaves his post,” he said.“They face kidnappings and their families are threatened.”

Iraqi soldiers can have close ties to the enemy. One of the worst examples occurred last month in Sadr City, when the Americans, in keeping with the new rhetoric that they are partners with the Iraqi army, sent a convoy to capture Abu Dera, the leader of a death squad.

The Iraqis were stopped by signals from the Mahdi army, a Shi’ite militia that controls the slum. The Iraqis pulled back so the Americans went in alone, faced heavy fire and were unable to find Abu Dera, who had been tipped off.

However, another joint operation was a success, leading to the arrest of an infamous sheikh, suspected of killing 40 Shi’ites from a local factory.

“We’re not training them to be the US army,” Wilson said. “There’s not going to be a magic day when they’re ready. We’re training them to suffice.”

Ahmed says that although he cried when Saddam fell, it was because he felt dishonoured as a soldier who could not defend his country. Now he is proud.

“The difference is that the Iraqi army under Saddam fought the Iraqi people,” the general said. “The new army is fighting to protect the people.”

Explore World News

• World Agenda

• Iraq News

• US & Americas News

• Europe News

• Middle East News

• Asia News

• Africa News

• Ireland News

Times Recommends

• Rio Tinto four held as China prepares case
• Diplomats must keep heads down and trousers up
• When in Rome should one make like Berlusconi?