President Musharraf was visibly uncomfortable as he stood by President Bush at a press conference on March 4, 2006. Mr Bush said he had come to Islamabad to determine how committed the Pakistani leader was to the War on Terror.
The comments reflected growing frustration in Washington with Musharraf's failure to crack down on Taleban insurgents. During his 24-hour stay, Bush came closer than he had ever been to Osama bin Laden.
While praising Musharraf for his “courage”, Bush called upon his “buddy” to do more to curb Islamic militancy and stop Taleban insurgents crossing into Afghanistan. The public admonition caused serious embarrassment to the Pakistani military leader, who had risked his life by supporting the US in the War on Terror.
A day earlier, in New Delhi, Mr Bush had hailed India as an emerging world power and awarded it an unprecedented nuclear technology deal. All Musharraf got was a lecture on getting tougher with the Taleban and vague promises of future economic, military and technological assistance.
He appeared to be in an impossible position. His politics of expediency had given huge latitude to the radical Islamists. Despite his promise to reform them, thousands of madrassas across the country remained breeding grounds for Islamic extremism. The military had been bogged down in Waziristan where Islamist militants operated freely, despite being banned.
The devasating earthquake of October 2005 highlighted how much more power and effectiveness the jihadist groups had on the ground compared to the Government. The 2002 ban had caused many of the main militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, to reinvent themselves as welfare organisations. With grassroots networks, their well-disciplined cadres were the first to reach the quakestricken areas. Within hours of the tragedy, they had begun to rescue those trapped and provided emergency treatment to the injured.
Their success strengthened their claims to legitimacy and while their popularity soared, the Government seemed directionless.
The jihadists’ new-found prestige was evident during the protests last February over a Danish newspaper’s publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. The Islamists turned the protests into a violent anti-government agitation. Hundreds and thousands of people took to the streets across Pakistan, chanting “Death to America” and “Death to Musharraf”.
The furore exposed the fissures that had widened over preceding years.
For the first time since Musharraf had seized power in October 1999, there were frequent and violent protests in the country, drawing thousands of people.
Musharraf’s unwillingness to cede power, and the lack of democratic progress, meant there had been little headway in countering Islamic extremism. The Government had failed to build independent state and political institutions, or establish free elections, and therefore provided a conducive environment for extremism to flourish. Any steps Musharraf took to introduce a modicum of democracy were countered by measures to increase his or the military’s power.
The military-led Government has been widely credited with turning the economy round. From near insolvency, it achieved more than 8 per cent growth in 2005, with aid from the West. Pakistan also benefited post-9/11 from many remittances from expatriates, which boosted the stock market. The country witnessed the emergence of a new middle class and this drastically changed spending patterns, spurring demands for motorcycles, cars, and other consumer goods. But despite the financial improvements, Pakistan remains plagued with rising poverty and unemployment. Around one third of the population still lives below the poverty line. The high economic growth, without corresponding social improvement, has created an explosive social situation that extremist could exploit.
In the War on Terror, few have produced results to match Musharraf’s. His security forces have captured and delivered to the US several of the most wanted al-Qaeda terrorists, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the masterminds of the September 11 attacks.
There is, however, little evidence of him showing the same resolve in dealing with Islamic militancy at home — largely because of a lack of consistency in his policies. The alleged Pakistani link to the suicide bombings in London on July 7, 2005 and the foiled plot to blow up flights from London to the US in August 2006 indicate that the international terrorist network continues to operate from Pakistan.
The fight against militancy and Islamic extremism can be best fought — and won — in a liberal democracy. Musharraf’s authoritarian rule has blocked any hopes of a democratic process taking root.
It is clear that the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is not a priority for Washington, because a leader in military uniform can deliver far more than a democratically elected one — An army general ruling Pakistan does not trouble the West, so long as he happens to be an effective ally in the War against Terror.
Washington’s backing may have given Musharraf a huge boost, but that cannot change realities at home. Anger at his close relationship with the US has long generated support for Islamic radicals among many Pakistani and — despite the backing of the army and America — Musharraf is living on borrowed time. He has spawned a system that is a hybrid of military and civilian rule.
So far, the military’s backing has given a semblance of stability, but the system is crumbling under the weight of its contradiction. There is no succession principle, which will inevitably lead to a takeover by another general in the event that something happens to Musharraf.
His country faces a real danger of fragmentation, with radical Islamists controlling part of the country. The growing influence of militant Islam, particularly in the North West Frontier Province and the western province of Balochistan, is ominous.
Militants, who fashion themselves on the Taleban, have established rigid Islamic rule in the Waziristan tribal region. The situation is more worrying as their influence spills over to other areas of the North West Frontier Province. In many parts of the province, the militants have forcibly closed down video and music shops and internet cafés, declaring them un-Islamic. Barbers are warned not to shave beards, and people are prohibited from playing music, even at weddings, and from watching television. Women are barred from coming out of their homes on their own. It will be difficult to contain the spread of this trend to other parts of the country.
Musharraf’s support for the War on Terror, his tactical co-operation with certain militant groups, and his refusal to embed a culture of democracy and accountability have intensified social, ethnic and religious differences in Pakistani society. These are the faultlines from which a geopolitical earthquake could erupt — an earthquake that would make the current regional security situation look calm. Pakistan’s battle with itself is far from over.
