Click here to see where aid to Helmand province is spent

Once the Taleban stronghold of northern Helmand, Musa Qala echoed eight months ago to the sudden fanfare of promises and expectations that followed its recapture by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan troops. Keen to capitalise on their first tangible victory in 18 months, the British announced a series of projects to rebuild the town, while the Afghan Government vowed to reverse years of neglect.

“If we can't get it right in Musa Qala then we can't get it right anywhere,” David Slinn, the Foreign Office chief in Helmand at the time, stated in January.

In the baking July heat, with temperatures soaring to 52C (125F) in the shade, the sun burns down on a rather diminished reality. Stalled development projects, misappropriated funds, corruption, intimidation: the British stabilisation strategy has encountered a sobering set of obstacles in Musa Qala that have left it well short of the utopian state imagined in winter.

“It is the eighth month of government here. ISAF, the Afghan Army, the Afghan police - can they show the work they have done in this district?” one elder challenged during last week's shurah meeting between the town leaders and British officers. “You must show your work here. Civilians need to understand that you are working for them.”

From the start, the British Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - the joint civilian and military organisation based in the capital of Helmand, Lashkar Gah - was powerless to prevent Afghan subcontractors from carving up British-funded projects among themselves.

The ensuing bungs, bribes and embezzlement ensured that much of the money disappeared long before it could be spent on reconstruction projects, some of which are now falling apart as a result of inferior materials and shoddy construction.

“I am very aware that when a contractor is given a contract, he subcontracts it many, many times before the building starts,” Justin Holt, the Royal Marine colonel sent to Musa Qala last month as stabilisation adviser, admitted to the shurah. “I agree with members of the shurah that in eight months there hasn't been much visible progress. But we've learnt some valuable lessons.”

The main bazaar road in Musa Qala, 500 metres long and funded by the British to a tune of £100,000, is one such lesson. Though only three months old, it is already the target of Afghan ire.

“The contractors made it out of poor-quality cement and gravel and now it is ruined,” Mullah Abdul Salaam, the Governor of Musa Qala, said. “No one in the bazaar is happy with the project. The contractors didn't spend all the money they were given by the PRT.”

The health clinic, another British project (£115,000), provokes similar comment among locals. The Afghan head of the Health Department has not been able to approve the clinic for use, despite three visits, as there is no running water and no electricity, few doors are in place and the plasterwork crumbles.

The contractor, who was due to be dismissed two days ago unless he had rectified the problem, had allegedly multiplied material prices threefold between what he actually paid and what he charged.

The town mosque, central to local concerns since it was destroyed by the British during fighting two years ago and listed as the prime Afghan-funded reconstruction project, is still in ruins. Residents have demanded a bigger mosque than the one offered, while the donor Afghan Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development is accused of short-changing the contractor, who cannot move materials overland anyway, as the Taleban prevent road access.

The Governor of Helmand attempted to lay a foundation stone at the site in May but aborted the plan when his helicopter was hit by a rocket as it was about to land. Nothing has happened since.

The electricity supply, though improved over the past month, is still worse than it was under the Taleban. Locals say that it now generates between three and five hours of power every four days, as opposed to the one day off, one day on supply they had during Taleban rule.

Only one Afghan ministry has an office in the town despite assurances in January of full government presence in Musa Qala. Meanwhile, the British-funded cash-for-work scheme, under which locals were paid $8 (£4) a day for casual labour, had its labour force cut by 75 per cent at the weekend after a deadline had expired for the Afghan managing the scheme to present his accounts - adding about 200 men to the list of unemployed.

“There was a lot of destruction here during the fighting with the British,” Mullah Salaam said. “There has not been the same amount of reconstruction.”

Mullah Salaam, along with several other members of the shurah, has been accused of trying to extort money from contractors. The latter have reported intimidation and even the arrest of their workforce by the governor's policemen, who have themselves not been paid for the last month and a half.

While acknowledging the realities of the situation, British officers in the town remain philosophical. “I'm pleased that there is a sufficiently stable security situation for us even to have a discussion about how quickly, or not, reconstruction is progressing,” Lieutenant-Colonel Nick Borton, who commands the battle group in Musa Qala, said.

There have been some notable successes. Local commerce is thriving in a hugely improved security environment. A six-strong military stabilisation team has made progress in establishing local governance and an Afghan civil secretariat, an executive and judicial shurah have been formed to work in conjunction with Mullah Salaam, a crucial step in empowering Afghans to take control of their affairs.

In the security domain, British troops have done their best to mould local militias into a police force that, while far from exemplary, is an improvement on what it was before despite the dubious past of the individuals concerned.

In its defence, the PRT insists that the creation of local governance is a more vital strand in the “Helmand Road Map” than reconstruction.

Given the totemic role of Musa Qala in British efforts to stabilise Helmand - the 10,000sqkm (3,800 sq miles) area of responsibility for the 1,200 troops stationed in the district, the evolving enemy and urgent need to win the hearts of the local population - it is surprising that it has taken seven months for the PRT to send a permanent stabilisation adviser to join British soldiers in the town.

Further PRT advisers are due to arrive later this summer, part of an enhanced deployment throughout Helmand. If their entry allays the concerns expressed by the Musa Qala shurah, it may yet have some way to go in recapturing confidence in the British troops - and the soldiers' confidence in the administrators.

“They wouldn't know how to pour p*** from a boot if the instructions were on the heel,” one soldier remarked. “That's the PRT.”

FORTRESS OF MOSES

— Musa Qala - Fortress of Moses - is a market town in the north of Helmand with a Pashtun majority population of less than 20,000

— It is the administrative centre for the district of the same name and is located on a small tributary of the Helmand river

— It was retaken by the Taleban when British forces handed it to tribal elders in 2006, then taken again by the British last December

— It sits astride a big drug-trafficking route that leads from the lower, southern portion of Helmand into the mountainous north

— An estimated 70 heroin laboratories and £150 million of opium were located and destroyed in the district last December

— Mullah Abdul Salaam, the current Governor and a former Taleban commander, was appointed after British forces retook the town last year

Source: Times archives

Times Recommends

• No apology for Germany’s own Nazi victims
• Intricate web of fear and hope tying down deal
• Victims remembered a year after Mumbai attacks