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here to see where aid to Helmand province is spent
Once the Taleban stronghold of northern Helmand, Musa Qala echoed eight months
ago to the sudden fanfare of promises and expectations that followed its
recapture by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan
troops. Keen to capitalise on their first tangible victory in 18 months, the
British announced a series of projects to rebuild the town, while the Afghan
Government vowed to reverse years of neglect.
“If we can't get it right in Musa Qala then we can't get it right anywhere,”
David Slinn, the Foreign Office chief in Helmand at the time, stated in
January.
In the baking July heat, with temperatures soaring to 52C (125F) in the shade,
the sun burns down on a rather diminished reality. Stalled development
projects, misappropriated funds, corruption, intimidation: the British
stabilisation strategy has encountered a sobering set of obstacles in Musa
Qala that have left it well short of the utopian state imagined in winter.
“It is the eighth month of government here. ISAF, the Afghan Army, the Afghan
police - can they show the work they have done in this district?” one elder
challenged during last week's shurah meeting between the town leaders
and British officers. “You must show your work here. Civilians need to
understand that you are working for them.”
From the start, the British Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - the joint
civilian and military organisation based in the capital of Helmand, Lashkar
Gah - was powerless to prevent Afghan subcontractors from carving up
British-funded projects among themselves.
The ensuing bungs, bribes and embezzlement ensured that much of the money
disappeared long before it could be spent on reconstruction projects, some
of which are now falling apart as a result of inferior materials and shoddy
construction.
“I am very aware that when a contractor is given a contract, he subcontracts
it many, many times before the building starts,” Justin Holt, the Royal
Marine colonel sent to Musa Qala last month as stabilisation adviser,
admitted to the shurah. “I agree with members of the shurah
that in eight months there hasn't been much visible progress. But we've
learnt some valuable lessons.”
The main bazaar road in Musa Qala, 500 metres long and funded by the British
to a tune of £100,000, is one such lesson. Though only three months old, it
is already the target of Afghan ire.
“The contractors made it out of poor-quality cement and gravel and now it is
ruined,” Mullah Abdul Salaam, the Governor of Musa Qala, said. “No one in
the bazaar is happy with the project. The contractors didn't spend all the
money they were given by the PRT.”
The health clinic, another British project (£115,000), provokes similar
comment among locals. The Afghan head of the Health Department has not been
able to approve the clinic for use, despite three visits, as there is no
running water and no electricity, few doors are in place and the plasterwork
crumbles.
The contractor, who was due to be dismissed two days ago unless he had
rectified the problem, had allegedly multiplied material prices threefold
between what he actually paid and what he charged.
The town mosque, central to local concerns since it was destroyed by the
British during fighting two years ago and listed as the prime Afghan-funded
reconstruction project, is still in ruins. Residents have demanded a bigger
mosque than the one offered, while the donor Afghan Ministry for Rural
Rehabilitation and Development is accused of short-changing the contractor,
who cannot move materials overland anyway, as the Taleban prevent road
access.
The Governor of Helmand attempted to lay a foundation stone at the site in May
but aborted the plan when his helicopter was hit by a rocket as it was about
to land. Nothing has happened since.
The electricity supply, though improved over the past month, is still worse
than it was under the Taleban. Locals say that it now generates between
three and five hours of power every four days, as opposed to the one day
off, one day on supply they had during Taleban rule.
Only one Afghan ministry has an office in the town despite assurances in
January of full government presence in Musa Qala. Meanwhile, the
British-funded cash-for-work scheme, under which locals were paid $8 (£4) a
day for casual labour, had its labour force cut by 75 per cent at the
weekend after a deadline had expired for the Afghan managing the scheme to
present his accounts - adding about 200 men to the list of unemployed.
“There was a lot of destruction here during the fighting with the British,”
Mullah Salaam said. “There has not been the same amount of reconstruction.”
Mullah Salaam, along with several other members of the shurah, has been
accused of trying to extort money from contractors. The latter have reported
intimidation and even the arrest of their workforce by the governor's
policemen, who have themselves not been paid for the last month and a half.
While acknowledging the realities of the situation, British officers in the
town remain philosophical. “I'm pleased that there is a sufficiently stable
security situation for us even to have a discussion about how quickly, or
not, reconstruction is progressing,” Lieutenant-Colonel Nick Borton, who
commands the battle group in Musa Qala, said.
There have been some notable successes. Local commerce is thriving in a hugely
improved security environment. A six-strong military stabilisation team has
made progress in establishing local governance and an Afghan civil
secretariat, an executive and judicial shurah have been formed to
work in conjunction with Mullah Salaam, a crucial step in empowering Afghans
to take control of their affairs.
In the security domain, British troops have done their best to mould local
militias into a police force that, while far from exemplary, is an
improvement on what it was before despite the dubious past of the
individuals concerned.
In its defence, the PRT insists that the creation of local governance is a
more vital strand in the “Helmand Road Map” than reconstruction.
Given the totemic role of Musa Qala in British efforts to stabilise Helmand -
the 10,000sqkm (3,800 sq miles) area of responsibility for the 1,200 troops
stationed in the district, the evolving enemy and urgent need to win the
hearts of the local population - it is surprising that it has taken seven
months for the PRT to send a permanent stabilisation adviser to join British
soldiers in the town.
Further PRT advisers are due to arrive later this summer, part of an enhanced
deployment throughout Helmand. If their entry allays the concerns expressed
by the Musa Qala shurah, it may yet have some way to go in
recapturing confidence in the British troops - and the soldiers' confidence
in the administrators.
“They wouldn't know how to pour p*** from a boot if the instructions were on
the heel,” one soldier remarked. “That's the PRT.”
FORTRESS OF MOSES
— Musa Qala - Fortress of Moses - is a market town in the north of Helmand
with a Pashtun majority population of less than 20,000
— It is the administrative centre for the district of the same name and is
located on a small tributary of the Helmand river
— It was retaken by the Taleban when British forces handed it to tribal elders
in 2006, then taken again by the British last December
— It sits astride a big drug-trafficking route that leads from the
lower, southern portion of Helmand into the mountainous north
— An estimated 70 heroin laboratories and £150 million of opium were located
and destroyed in the district last December
— Mullah Abdul Salaam, the current Governor and a former Taleban commander,
was appointed after British forces retook the town last year
Source: Times archives
It should hardly come as any great surprise that things are going slow when dealing with a totally different culture and mentality, whilst still expecting western style results. To be fair to the military its deployment does seem to be having a marked improvement on security, despite Taleban effort
David Joyce, Thirsk,
Seems unfair to blame civilian aid workers when the military can't even maintain the most basic level of security. How are civilians - either Afghan or British - supposed to work in an area where a helicopter was just shot down?
John Smith, London,
w're doomed, over stretched, underfunded and just good old-fashioned doomed, here and there
peter c, devizes, wessex