M16 'didn't tell us that 7/7 bombers were in Pakistan'
Killer claims his innocence is proved by Musharraf's memoir
SINCE shortly after 9/11, when many members of al-Qaeda fled Afghanistan and
crossed the border into Pakistan, we have played cat and mouse with them.
The biggest of them all, Osama bin Laden, is still at large at the time of
this writing, but we have caught many, many others.
Some are known to the world, some are not. We have captured 689 and handed
over 369 to the United States. We have earned bounties totalling millions of
dollars. Those who habitually accuse us of “not doing enough” in the war on
terror should simply ask the CIA how much prize money it has paid to the
Government of Pakistan.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) was one of the most sought-after terrorists and
featured prominently on the FBI’s “most wanted” list. A Kuwaiti-born Iranian
national, KSM had most of his schooling in Kuwait and then attended college
in North Carolina in 1984. From there he transferred to North Carolina
Agricultural and Technical State University.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was a member of what is known as the “Afghan alumni”
terrorist network. Its sole reason for existence was to kill as many
Americans as possible, anywhere, anyhow.
In 1993 KSM spearheaded the attempt to blow up New York’s World Trade Centre,
along with his nephew Ramzi Yousef. Next, they plotted to blow up about a
dozen airliners flying from South-East Asia to the United States on the same
day. They also planned to dispatch a suicide pilot to crash into the CIA
headquarters in Langley, Virginia. This was called the Bojinka Operation.
None of these plans materialised, however, because Ramzi Yousef was arrested
in Pakistan in 1995 and handed over to the United States, shortly before he
could pull off the operation. Other conspirators were arrested, but KSM
managed to get away.
In the years that followed, before we arrested him in Pakistan, he devised
al-Qaeda’s most audacious plans, including the September 11 attacks.
During his interrogation we discovered that as early as 2002 he had been
working on plans to attack other London targets including Heathrow airport.
Another leading terrorist had been told by KSM to carry out reconnaissance
of, and prepare a plan to attack, Heathrow airport. After initial planning
he also suggested Canary Wharf as an additional possible target.
The Heathrow plot was to be staged first. Al-Qaeda planned to use airports and
airlines of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Croatia, Poland,
Romania and Malta to attack Heathrow because security at these airports and
in their aircraft was lax. Al-Qaeda also decided not to use too many Arab
hijackers to avoid suspicion.
Instead it planned to use hardened European Muslim veterans of the Bosnian
jihad and even Afghans. It asked Hazim al-Shair (killed in Saudi Arabia in
2004), the head of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, to recruit the pilots who would
take over the hijacked airliners. Failing that, he should send students to
flying schools. They would select flights that landed at Heathrow at about
the same time.
The signal for the hijackers to act would be the “fasten seatbelts” sign when
it was switched on before landing. For weapons they would use the stainless
steel cutlery on the plane as well as broken alcohol bottles. They hoped to
crash the aircraft into the various buildings of Heathrow. (Ac- cording to
KSM, another important al-Qaeda operative, Khallad bin Attash, suggested at
a later stage in the planning that they change the target from Heathrow to
some place in Israel but KSM did not agree.) All this information was passed
on to the British authorities and fortunately the attack on Heathrow never
came to fruition. This was one of our many hidden successes. ()
We later captured an associate of KSM and gave the British direct access to
him. This would later reveal a link with Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad
Tanweer, two of the people who were to carry out the suicide attacks on
London’s underground system on July 7, 2005. This information about Siddique
and Tanweer was not shared with us until July 28, 2005, three weeks after
the attacks in London and despite the fact that Siddique and Tanweer had
been spotted 17 months earlier.
When KSM started his life as a terrorist he was not with al-Qaeda; he had his
own network. During much of the 1990s KSM first tried to maintain his
operational autonomy and resisted swearing allegiance to any terrorist
leader, because he thought of himself as being in the same mould as Osama
bin Laden. But after the failure of Bojinka and the arrest of Ramzi Yousef,
he decided to develop closer ties with al-Qaeda.
In 1996, after Osama bin Laden had moved back to Afghanistan, KSM met him in
Tora Bora. He told Osama about his role in the bombing of the World Trade
Centre in 1993 and the Bojinka Operation. KSM presented the idea of 9/11 to
Osama bin Laden, but Osama vetoed it, asking KSM to join al-Qaeda first.
Wishing to retain his independence, KSM refused.
In 1998 or 1999, perhaps persuaded by Abu Hafs al-Masri — now known to the
world by his alias, Mohammad Atef — Osama bin Laden approved the plan for
9/11, though of course at that time the exact date could not have been
determined. As soon as KSM learnt that Osama was on board, he brought his
family from Qatar to Kandahar in Afghanistan.
The plan for 9/11 was kept secret between Osama bin Laden, Atef and KSM.
Intelligence sources indicate that by 2000 Mullah Omar probably had a fair
idea that largescale operations on American soil were planned, but he did
not know any details. It is also said that he was not happy about it but
apparently could do nothing. Mohammad Atef and Osama bin Laden shortlisted
the operatives for 9/11 and asked KSM to select the best of them. Al-Qaeda’s
shoora council, or consultative committee, approved the plan in August 2001.
On September 21 or 22, 2001, Osama bin Laden recalled KSM to Afghanistan, even
though KSM wanted to stay where he was. After analysing the suicide
hijackings, they both got involved in the defence of Afghanistan and the
transfer of their families to Pakistan.
Having been tipped off, our intelligence agents spotted an associate of KSM at
Islamabad international airport on the morning of February 28, 2003. He was
scheduled to meet KSM that evening. Our source informed us that they would
be using two houses on Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi. A plan was immediately
drawn up to arrest them alive. The problem was that our source was
unfamiliar with the area and knew the houses only by sight. But by sheer
ingenuity, coupled with a deep familiarity with the area, our agents were
able to identify the houses on the basis of simple descriptions. At 1.45 the
next morning, they surrounded the houses. The entrance doors were broken
down and our agents rushed in, brandishing weapons and shouting. In one of
the houses a man on the ground floor, taken by surprise, immediately pointed
upward and said: “They are up there.”
Without breaking their momentum our agents ran upstairs and found KSM and his
accomplice Mustafa al-Hawsawi with loaded Kalashnikovs beside them. When KSM
managed to pick up his Kalashnikov, one of our officers tried to wrest it
from his hand; the gun went off and a bullet hit and injured the officer.
But before KSM and Mustafa could do further damage, they were overpowered
and arrested. It had been a smooth, quick operation. We kept KSM in custody
for three days, during which time we interrogated him fully.
Once we were done with him and had all the information we wanted, we handed
him over to the United States Government.
© Pervez Musharraf 2006. Extracted from In The Line of Fire, published by
Simon & Schuster at £18.99. Available from The Times BooksFirst at
£17.09 (0870 1608080, www.timesonline.co.uk/booksfirst)
