In a week’s time, Nato is going to rebuff Georgia and Ukraine’s hopes of joining the alliance. How should its 26 members handle this to avoid giving Russia the appearance of victory?

Difficult. Foreign ministers are looking for face-savers before the gathering on December 2 in Brussels. They have a messy package of compensations that are certainly not worthless, but stop a long way short of a plan for joining.

But the dilemma looks easier than in April, when France and Germany blocked the US drive to let Georgia and Ukraine in. The two candidate countries have helped by disqualifying themselves, in different ways, from any real chance of joining for a long time. Georgia has done that by its impetuous decision to take on Russia over its two breakaway provinces. The details that have emerged about the ignition of the conflict are hotly disputed, but undermine some of the Georgian claim to have been merely the passive victim of Russian aggression (although they also support its accusations of Russian provocation, and of its detailed preparation for the move). Ukraine is out of contention because of the collapse of its Government and the deep division of its people about whether they want to side with the West or Russia.

This is the real face-saver. So, too, is the arrival of a new US president and the simultaneous weakening of Russia, which has been hit badly by the falling oil price and plunging stock markets. These changes turn the question into a more important one: how does the US now want to treat Russia? But the answers to that will come from Washington over the next year, not Brussels next week. Georgia blames the stormy April summit for giving Russia an effective green light to move into South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has a point. Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, argued that the two countries were not ready, and explicitly, that Russia should not be provoked into anger. Instead, it seems, it was provoked into extending its territorial reach.

The Russian move has strengthened a sense of Western alliance. Before August, Polish public opinion was firmly against the notion of hosting new US missile defences. But in the face of Russian belligerence, opposition melted, and Polish ministers took advantage of the chance to sign the deal.

Yet it has also been clear since late summer that Nato was not going to offer either Georgia or Ukraine a membership action plan (MAP) – the “road map” towards membership – at the December meeting. In April, members had promised to look at the question again at the next gathering. But by September, British officials were wriggling round the question (despite Britain’s support in principle). They tried to spin out the line that the April promise – of full membership, eventually – was worth more than MAP. “Who are you kidding?” was the tired response from Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine has pointed out this week that Russia has made menacing demands for payment of gas arrears, stirring memories of the 2006 “gas war”, when it cut supplies.

The two countries know that the package of trade and defence links that they will be offered next week is the best they will get for now. If Russia does not provoke the new White House into a tough stance, that may be all they get for some time.

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