WE PROBABLY haven’t heard the last of the gunfire on the streets of Baghdad, and some enemy forces remain entrenched in Tikrit. But the scent of victory, if not the end of the operation, is certainly in the air. And already it is worth asking what was distinctive about this conflict, and what are the implications for the future?

In the first place, the campaign successfully defeated the Iraqi forces and occupied their capital after a 350-mile lunge in about three weeks with very light friendly losses. This is the confirmation of the soundness of the plan — deep manoeuvre, simultaneous air and ground action, risk-taking on the long supply lines and lunging for the enemy’s centre of gravity. If the key trade-off in the plan was to launch without the 4th Infantry Division on the ground, rather than wait a month to redeploy into Kuwait, then this was a decision vindicated by the outcome.

As for stunning the enemy with precision bombing, well, it probably did work, eventually, through the physical disruption of command centres and communications. While some proponents may have raised excessive expectations, the effects of the strikes were cumulative and increasingly severe. Perhaps more could have been done at the outset, but it is unlikely that this would have affected the course of the war.

What may have changed the outcome, though, was the rapid retargeting of a single B1 bomber which struck Saddam’s restaurant hideaway within 45 minutes of receiving word of his whereabouts. Near real-time precision has finally arrived. Any potential adversary must think carefully what this means.

Airpower also demonstrated increased effectiveness in direct support of the ground troops. Unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk, Predator and Hunter passed real-time full-motion video and other intelligence down to the command centres. With this technology, airpower did a good job hitting Republican Guard divisions positioned around Baghdad. They didn’t destroy all the Iraqis’ heavy equipment, but they set them up for defeat by the advancing American ground forces.

Then there was the striking sweep of the US army forces which avoided the towns, raced across the desert, and opened the gates to Baghdad. Some of this was the result of technology — newer vehicles with better cross-country mobility, and wider use of the global positioning system — but much of it was a function of a superior training process adopted by the US Army in the 1980s.

And this wasn’t just about movement, it was about opposed movement. Here the gunnery, manoeuvre and mobility skills of the coalition forces were so far superior to the defenders’ that the outcome could never be in doubt, no matter what the ratios of the forces.

In one battle, a US cavalry troop of about five tanks and four Bradleys detected an Iraqi force of 25 armoured vehicles in a prepared defensive position on their flank, and in a battle that lasted about ten minutes they destroyed every one of them while suffering no friendly losses. Surely even the doubters will take the lessons this time: quality, not quantity, is the key requirement for success in battle.

As for urban combat, the British troops did a remark-able job managing the high-risk problem of Basra in a way that minimised risks, losses and destruction. And the Americans proved that the combination of unlimited airpower, unmanned aerial vehicles and highly protected, mobile, well-armed forces is very tough to defeat, whatever the lessons of Stalingrad.

Innovative “thunder runs” into the built-up areas inflicted casualties on the Iraqis, took advantage of their inability to mass and manoeuvre, and no doubt badly undercut their confidence.

But all these achievements must be balanced against the capabilities of our adversary, a large power whose military was starved of resources for more than a decade. They sought a pair of retired Russian generals to validate their plan. They put their men into firing positions without the skills to face our soldiers. They hid their aircraft, largely kept their air defence radars turned off and quickly surrendered air supremacy to the coalition.

Longer-range missiles were never fired, and even those that were, with a single exception, failed to penetrate the improved Patriot defences in Kuwait and the mobile US army forces. Chemical weapons must have been available at some point, and perhaps there were plans to use them. But destruction of their command system would have prevented their use. Deep tunnels do not prevent defeat.

The campaign in Iraq illustrates the continuing progress of military technology and tactics, but if there is a single overriding lesson it must be this: American military power, especially when buttressed by Britain’s, is virtually unchall- engeable today. Take us on? Don’t try! And that’s not hubris, it’s just plain fact.

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