THE military operation in Iraq has been stunning. The bulk of the operation has almost realised the Pentagon’s best hopes. Almost, but not quite. There was a stutter at the beginning of the campaign and there are still a number of stings in the tail.

The “shock and awe” air campaign did not come immediately to life and gave the Iraqis more breathing space than was intended. The Iraqi people did not immediately welcome coalition troops into Basra, and fedayeen attacks and sandstorms gave the world images of an offensive that looked improvised and stretched to a standstill. The coalition lost the first round of the PR battle.

As the strategy played itself out, however, the sheer power of the offensive to Baghdad appeared overwhelming. The critical moment came overnight on Monday, April 7. After two “thunder runs” into western and southern Baghdad, first with an armoured battle group and then with an armoured brigade, US commanders decided to see whether they could maintain their position overnight. In the morning, after a series of attacks, they were still there and with that the fate of Saddam’s regime was sealed.

The focus of the world’s media was on the dramatic spectacle of manoeuvre warfare by powerful armoured forces. The reality of modern armoured warfare was far more complex, however. It depended on a uniquely close integration between ground forces and air power.

Air forces the world over hate having to do ground support, not least because it is the most hazardous type of operation for aircrew. But in this case they did it with excellent information, with Predator drones giving them constant pictures of the battle space, precision bombs that could be dropped accurately from safer heights, control of Iraqi airspace and lots of backup.

The holy grail for military planners is to be able to make and carry out decisions more quickly than the enemy can respond, and to reduce the “sensor-to-shooter” times to a minimum.

In the attack in the al- Mansour district of Baghdad where Saddam was believed to be, Central Command got an intelligence tip-off about his whereabouts, confirmed it with two other pieces of (electronic) intelligence, and called in a B-1B bomber circling in the “cab rank” over Iraq waiting to be given its target in less than 45 minutes. Twelve minutes after being assigned, the aircraft dropped four bombs. Accuracy, and sensor-to-shooter times like this are impossible to counter.

The US also employed modern logistics, using the latest management techniques to supply daily the half a million gallons of fuel and the 33,000 gallons of water that US forces needed.

Special forces were not much in evidence, but very much in demand. They controlled western Iraq, opened airbases for the coalition, eliminated the threat of Scud attacks on Israel, and conducted an Afghanistan-style campaign in the north to harness Kurdish guerrillas.

US forces tried a novel way of capturing Baghdad — to drive rapidly into the open areas, avoid the populated sectors and attack the regime’s signals, sending messages to Saddam’s followers that it was all over.

If the overall strategy was predictable, the coalition nevertheless achieved tactical surprise at almost every turn. As Air Marshal Brian Burridge, commander of British forces, put it: “People will be writing about this at staff college for decades to come.”

Nevertheless, there are stings in the tail. Having taken Baghdad at the first push, guerrilla attacks from the suburbs that were not occupied, and gross disorder in the ones that were, remain likely. The speed of toppling Saddam with so few troops leaves the coalition seriously short of boots on the ground.

The situation in Basra is less fraught, reflecting the gradual tactics adopted by British forces. Major-General Robin Brimms, the commander in Basra, is establishing a leadership council and has the remnants of a local police force to build on.

Beyond Baghdad and Basra, the same civil order problems have to be faced elsewhere. The town of Tikrit will be a separate problem, whether it folds or becomes the Alamo for Ba’athism.

A delicate transition to civil administration and normality must follow. The military knows it has to maintain basic humanitarian needs and local order. That is a simple requirement of the Geneva Convention. Claims that looting is an acceptable pressure valve are inconsistent with those obligations.

Troops also know they have to create the basic conditions in which the international humanitarian community can operate. Experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan shows that making the transition is always difficult.

The UN and other international agencies, and the 300 or so NGOs that flood into crisis zones, are slow to get up and running and near impossible to organise into a single response. After about a year they have usually become part of the problem.

Nor is the military a surrogate police force. The needs of policing go well beyond foot patrols and roadblocks: they require investigation of the mafias, black markets, narcotics and trafficking that accompany a crisis zone.

The US should also consider some longer term implications of its success. It has demonstrated to the world a military omnipotence. It has developed a war for one.

So where will those who oppose America turn for military inspiration — to Al-Qaeda terrorism, or the nuclear assertiveness of North Korea? If the “evil” forces that the Bush administration fears are not deterred by this war, they will need a different strategy to that of Saddam.

Professor Michael Clarke is director of the International Policy Institute at King’s College London

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