Britain’s phased exit from Iraq has begun at an extraordinary time: security in Basra is worse now than it was three years ago, Shia militia extremist groups are battling it out for supremacy in the south, and Iranian influence is everywhere to be seen. Hardly the right conditions, one might suggest, for British troops to start withdrawing.

However, there comes a point when the military and the politicians have to decide whether the continuing presence of more than 7,000 British troops in southern Iraq is a positive factor, helping to improve security and the Iraqi people’s lives or whether they are part of the cause of the continuing violence.

This was the question raised so controversially by General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the Army, in his interview with the Daily Mail last October. But the real question is not whether the British are seen as an occupying, and therefore hostile, force in the minds of the Iraqis in the south - there are many Iraqis who have been begging the British to stay for fear of the consequences if they go home - but whether the Iraqi military and police forces can be trusted to take over the security responsibilities.

Despite all the encouraging signs in recent months, the answer is not yet clear. But unless they are given a chance to prove themselves, with the British in the background to step in if required, Iraq’s future will remain in the balance, and those intent on undermining stability in the south will take advantage and pursue their selfish, political ambitions.

An event took place in Basra on Tuesday which was hardly noticed, but which was symbolically significant. Iraq’s 10th Division, the army formation that has been nurtured and trained by British and Australian troops for the last three years, finally began taking its orders from Baghdad instead of the British commander of the Multinational Force Southeast in Basra.

The 10th Division of 12,500 troops is led by an admirable Iraqi commander called General Abdul Latif, who signed a memorandum of understanding with Major-General Jonathan Shaw, the British General Officer Commanding the multinational force. The division now comes under the command of a military headquarters in Baghdad. A small step but another sign of the Iraqis taking charge.

There are still concerns about the Iraqi police whose loyalty and dedication to the job are not guaranteed. Indeed, many are more committed to serving the cause of the Shia extremists than to the inhabitants of Basra province and elsewhere in the south. Nevetheless, with a strong army division watching over them, the police will gradually be reformed, and the bad eggs removed.

So what is left for the British to do? Increasingly their role will be to mentor their Iraqi counterparts but to move further into the background. The 4,000 troops expected to stay behind once the withdrawals have been completed by the end of this year will be consolidated in the large base at Basra airport. Patrols are also likely to continue, especially along the border with Iran, but it will be up to the Iraqis to decide what operations are necessary.

One of the problems with the Iraq story is that Washington has always seen it in terms of victory - or defeat. Operations of this nature should never be categorised in such a way. It’s too simplistic. But behind all the violence, the death of members of the British Armed Forces - 101, two of them women, killed in action - and horrific scenes, such as the soldiers set on fire during riots in March 2004 , there have been some outstanding achievements.

Mostly unpublicised, work has been going on ever since the end of the combat phase of the war on May 1 2003 to improve the lives of the Iraqis, to get children to school and to rebuild a society which had been cowed by three decades of tyranny. That has meant creating a new legal structure, developing a banking system, and forming an administrative framework out of which democratic, provincial government has emerged.

The British troops were greeted as liberators when they swept through Basra, and there was a genuine feeling of relief, even euphoria among the Iraqi people in the south. The euphoria did not last long because their expectations of instant improvement to their lives did not materialise.

Saddam Hussein had destroyed so much of the infrastructure by deliberate neglect that it was impossible to make short-term, dramatic changes. As the Iraqi people became disillusioned, the struggle for power led to violence and attacks on the British.

For the sake of those soldiers, sailors and airmen who have sacrificed their lives for Iraq, the Government’s exit strategy must not be viewed as a consequence of failure. If the Iraqi forces can successfully take charge, there is reason for optimism that Iraq will emerge as a reasonably democratic and stable nation.

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