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WHEN the British went into Iraq they were believed to have more expertise in counter-insurgency than their US allies still learning the lessons of humiliation in Vietnam.

But now they are facing their own “Saigon moment” with plans for a withdrawal predicted by some on the British side to be ignominious and by a US military adviser to be ugly and embarrassing.

Not only that, but the British are expected to rely on US troops for cover to protect their convoys. Some officers are expressing concern about the way their campaign is ending.

Next month the British will pull back from their last base in the city of Basra at Saddam’s old summer palace. What the Ministry of Defence is keen to avoid is a photograph of the last helicopter taking off from the palace. The image would be too close to that of the last helicopter taking off from the American embassy in Saigon in April 1975, an enduring symbol of US defeat.

The troops on the British helicopters will not be leaving Iraq. They will be pulling back to their base at the airport outside the city to await the final order to withdraw.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, chief of defence staff, has denied US claims that the British have been defeated in southern Iraq, saying that their mission was to put the Ira-qis back in control and that they will soon achieve it. But British soldiers fear that withdrawal will look like defeat, and the way in which it is taking place will make them more vulnerable, resulting in higher casualties.

They are already under relentless rocket fire from the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army. An average of 40 attacks a week are hitting the airport base. The final withdrawal could take another six months, yet intelligence reports suggest that Shi’ite militia attacks will only rise over that period.

The death toll this year is already 41. It is set to exceed that of any previous year. The number of wounded already does so with 55 seriously or very seriously wounded by the end of last month. “History has shown that you cannot pull out in a measured manner,” one British officer said. “It is usually all or nothing. Aden was a classic example of what happens if you hang around.”

Casualty figures in 1964, the first year of the insurgency in Aden, the former British colony on the Arabian peninsula, were just two. But there were 44 casualties as the British prepared to leave in 1967, giving the impression of a defeat.

It is the final British withdrawal from Basra airport that is the cause of most concern, with military commanders expecting to lose between 10 and 15 men. Most of the troops will be flown out by Tristar, with some equipment being airlifted out in C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft.

But the bulk of the heavy equipment and vehicles will have to go by road, either to Kuwait or to the southern port of Umm Qasr where it could be loaded onto ferries.

“Britain won’t be able to pull all its troops out through the airport, which is why they will have to fight their way out,” said Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow of the US Council on Foreign Relations, who has advised President George W Bush.

The coalition’s overwhelming superiority in firepower, particularly from the air, will ensure that there is virtually no chance of massed attack. The RAF will fly Tornados to provide air cover and the US Navy will be able to provide Super Hornet aircraft from its carriers in the Gulf. Special forces will patrol the areas on either side of the convoys, dealing with any attempted ambushes.

The US is also expected to send thousands of troops to provide a protective cordon north of the Kuwaiti border.

But the militias can be expected to use the same insurgency tactics that have inflicted serious casualties on the coalition across Iraq, trying to harass the British troops in small numbers.

They are incapable of inflicting a real defeat: their attacks will be “theatre” aimed at creating the appearance of one. “They probably won’t fight in the open but in built-up areas along the road,” Biddle said.

British commanders are concerned that the Americans will add to that impression by sending in troops themselves. Biddle suggests they might need as many as two brigades in Basra, about 7,000 men.

“It’s quite clear the British didn’t have enough troops to stabilise the area,” he said. “The south is in badly declining shape and poses some serious dilemmas for the theatre command in Baghdad.”

One US Army officer said: “We could not afford to see southern Iraq overrun by insurgents which would threaten any future use of our main supply route from Kuwait.”

British officers believe that the potential difficulties posed by withdrawal are being “overhyped” by US counterparts. They believe the Americans were irritated by previous British suggestions that the US did not understand counter-insurgency tactics.

“I accept we haven’t done the best job possible in southern Iraq but that is largely the result of underresourcing,” one British officer said. “I cannot see how the Americans could do any better . . . Basra is a hell-hole because we do not have enough troops there to control the city. We have been left to hold the flag while politicians enjoy their holidays and wait for Bush to make a decision.”

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