FOUR months ago the scene would have been unthinkable. Captain Henry Moltz of
the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment led a small group of men up the
deserted street to a single-storey municipal building of mellow ochre brick
that had been cracked by mortar blasts during months of ruinous fighting
with Sunni insurgents.
At the entrance he was greeted with a kiss by Sheikh Sabah al-Janabi, a
leading member of the tribe that had spearheaded many of the pitiless Sunni
attacks on American forces in and around the little town of Jurf as Sakhr,
25 miles south of Baghdad.
As Moltz, 28, ducked out of the sun into the sparsely furnished interior last
Thursday, a second sheikh was waiting for him with another kiss and a look
of eager expectation. Moltz swiftly put him at his ease. “Sheikh, we have
the first payment,” he declared.
An aide pulled from his knapsack a thick, heavy wad of used notes tied with
rubber bands, and placed it on a table. Then came another, and another,
until the table was piled high with 19 bundles of 2.5m dinars each – worth
$38,000 (£19,000) in all.
Moltz looked the second sheikh, Taleb al-Janabi, in the eye. “If you keep to
your contract and keep fighting the enemy, we owe you the balance,” he said.
The balance is $189,000 (£93,000), to be paid over three months if the sheikh
sticks to his side of the bargain and drives out the largely foreign
fighters of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who have set up camp in date palm groves along
the banks of the Euphrates in Ruwiya, to the west.
Taleb nodded acknowledgement of the deal. The bricks of cash were bundled into
a plastic bag and he sat on a sagging sofa, cradling the money contentedly
in the lap of his grey dishdasha.
Now it was the turn of a third sheikh, Hamid al-Janabi, to step up to the
battered table, where three documents had been pinned down against the
breeze of a fan by a coffee cup, a mobile phone and a handheld radio.
As he signed them in green ink, it was possible to make out three blue dots on
the back of his hand – a traditional tattoo denoting membership of a Sunni
tribe that had been allied to Al-Qaeda and had helped to make life hell for
the Americans in a fertile strip of land that became one of the most
perilous in Iraq.
More bricks of dinars worth just over $30,000 (£15,000) were handed over, the
downpayment on an agreement worth $181,600 (£90,000). According to the
United States government purchase order-invoice voucher that Hamid signed,
he had undertaken to supply “Cops” to the quantity of “One (force)”. His
contract required him to provide 160 tribesmen to fight insurgents in
Farisiya, to the northwest, and prevent them from attacking American troops.
The “cops”, who will earn the hefty local rate of $370 (£180) a month, have
been fingerprinted and retina-scanned and will carry US identity cards. They
have already set up checkpoints and clashed with Al-Qaeda fighters whom they
supported before switching sides to the Americans.
One of the younger members of Moltz’s A Company acknowledged that he found it
hard to grasp such a rapid shifting of alliances.
“I’m not sure about this,” he said. “Two months ago, these guys were shooting
at us. Now we’re supposed to be friends. It’s kind of hard when you know
that guy blew up your buddy.”
Moltz, a Texan who has lost three close comrades in the attacks of the past
year, said simply: “They used to want to kill me, now they want to sign a
contract with me. It’s hard to get your head around but it is working.”
TALEB and Hamid were the latest recruits to a programme that could prove
pivotal in some areas to the prospects for the American “troop surge” under
General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq.
When Petraeus appears before Congress tomorrow to deliver his report on the
progress of the surge since troop numbers rose from 130,000 in February to
160,000 in June, he will be able to point to several startling successes in
parts of Iraq where violence has abated.
Although fighting continues to exact a grim toll of American soldiers and
Iraqi civilians alike in towns and cities where it is hard to see hope, the
recruitment of enemy sheikhs to the coalition cause has made officers such
as Moltz optimistic for the first time in four years of brutal insurgency.
The initiative is being run under the euphemistic title of “concerned citizens
programme”. “We thought of calling it the ex-terrorist programme but that
didn’t fly,” one officer joked.
In the area where Moltz’s A company operates, the number of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) detonated against American troops fell from 30 in
May to none in August. Nobody is saying the problems have gone away. The
policy of allying US forces with Sunni insurgents to confront Al-Qaeda has
proved so effective to the west of Baghdad in Anbar province – where Falluja
and Ramadi used to be the terrorists’ strongholds – that President George W
Bush described it as one of the safest parts of Iraq during a flying visit
last week.
Four American soldiers nevertheless died in combat operations in Anbar last
Thursday – a reminder, if any were needed, that after so much war, any peace
remains fragile. American deaths in Iraq have now passed 3,760 and the
number of Iraqi civilians killed last month alone was officially put at
1,773.
Some critics also worry that the deals with Sunni sheikhs might ultimately
turn them into warlords, even if the stated aim is for their private armies
to be absorbed into the Iraqi security forces as soon as possible.
However, the agreements signed in Jurf as Sakhr, Babil province, after a year
of intensive fighting seem to point to a way forward, both in protecting
American soldiers from attack and in crushing Al-Qaeda.
In the past year the Americans based in Babil have endured one of the most
relentlessly ferocious onslaughts seen by any US forces in Iraq. They found
themselves on a Sunni-Shi’ite fault-line that runs to the south of Baghdad’s
suburbs, and became targets for Iraqi militants on both sides of the
religious divide even before Al-Qaeda arrived to compound the misery.
The trouble went back to 2003, when the Iraqi army was disbanded after the
fall of Saddam Hussein. Members of the Janabi clan, many of whom had been
elite soldiers, returned home bitter at their loss of power to the Shi’ite
majority.
They formed the backbone of the Sunni insurgency in the province, establishing
makeshift bases among the groves of the Euphrates and its canals.
But this predominantly Sunni area also contains the Shi’ite towns of
Iskandariya and Musayyib, where the Mahdi Army of the radical, cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr holds sway.
The Mahdi militias rose up in a bloodthirsty quest for vengeance after the
Shi’ite Askariya shrine at Samarra was bombed in February, 2006. They
attacked seven Sunni mosques in Babil and then turned their anger on
American troops.
US losses were heavy – 51 American soldiers have died in Babil in the past 10
months – and Moltz’s A Company faced the grinding daily certainty of an
attack.
Mortars and rockets rained down on its Jurf as Sakhr compound, little more
than a collection of shipping containers with five camp beds each where the
men snatched what sleep they could behind concrete walls.
Whenever they left their outpost, they knew there was every chance of coming
under fire, whether from snipers or roadside bombs.
“It was crazy,” said Captain Kevin McDaniel, a platoon leader. “On one patrol
in December, we hit three IEDs and an ambush.”
On that particular patrol, McDaniel and his men were driving north up the
Euphrates when the lead vehicle was hit by by the first improvised explosive
device. “The second one was really big,” McDaniel said. “They had dug
a tunnel under the road and placed a ridiculous amount of explosive there.
It blew the front off a Humvee. The crater was up to my chin and 12ft wide.”
When he followed the detonating wire into a field to investigate, gunmen
opened up from behind the palms. “We fired off more than 1,000 rounds and
called in Apache helicopters,” he said. “On the way back we hit a third IED.
I couldn’t believe it.”
A series of disasters befell the men in rapid succession. Staff Sergeant
Christopher Brerard, a company favourite, was killed when insurgents
detonated explosives hidden beneath a roof where he was keeping watch. “You
felt if it could happen to him, it could happen to anyone,” McDaniel said.
Another member of the company lost both legs to an IED, and a third who was
wounded in the head has had nine brain operations and might never recover.
The outpost was mortared on Thanksgiving evening; the company’s Christmas
dinner was blown up; and at one point, a lorry pulled up to the blast wall
and gunmen who jumped out started blasting away at a watchtower.
Nobody was hurt in the latter incidents but morale hit rock bottom. The
company rarely saw the enemy and there seemed no prospect of a let-up in the
cycle of violence. The beginning of the troop surge in February went
virtually unremarked in Jurf as Sakhr. Many in the company were questioning
the point of being there.
When Sunni tribesmen started coming to parley, the troops’ suspicion was
understandable.
WHY the sheikhs’ sudden change of heart? Several reasons have been given.
Al-Qaeda followers who were initially honoured as allies, who led the
resistance from the front and paid well, had outstayed their welcome. Many
of the foreigners tried to enforce the strict rules of the Wahhabi strand of
Islam: locals were tortured for “unIslamic” behaviour – punished for
smoking, drinking and possessing photographs and films.
The tipping point seems to have come when Al-Qaeda fighters began forcibly
taking sheikhs’ daughters for their wives, perverting a tribal tradition of
forging alliances through marriage.
“It was a harsh, tyrannical regime,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Val Keaveny, a
commander who was in Anbar when its Sunni tribes came to the Americans to
talk about changing their allegiance. “Iraqis simply don’t want to live like
that.”
In the Jurf as Sakhr area, the Sunnis’ dissatisfaction coincided with
Petraeus’s surge strategy. In Baghdad the surge brought boots on the ground;
in Babil area, it meant more airpower. Fierce air assaults were launched on
insurgent hideouts up the Euphrates valley.
Moltz found that he was able to call for helicopter cover. Logistics improved.
The objectives were extended from pacifying the area to preventing
insurgents from using one of Babil’s main roads to transport weapons and car
bombs to Baghdad.
The Sunni sheikhs were getting worried. “They saw we were not going anywhere,
and they risked losing everything as the Shi'ites gained power,” said Major
Rick Williams, 45, who hosted the first talks. His expertise on tribal
politics is derived in part from his Cherokee Indian ancestry. Colleagues
call him “the sheikh dude”.
“They thought they should get some power while it was still possible or they
would be hung out to dry,” Williams said. “They are in the end responsible
for the wellbeing of their tribe.”
Williams called both Sunni and Shi’ite leaders to talks, but only the Sunnis
turned up. The negotiations started badly. The Sunnis insisted that the
Americans remove Nouri al-Maliki, the Shi’ite prime minister. Otherwise,
they said, they would stage a coup.
Discussions became serious in July with the involvement of Fadl al-Janabi, an
engineer at the local power plant. A colonel came across him carrying the
body of his sister, who had been killed by a mortar, down a road and gave
him a lift to the hospital. Later he came to the Americans and said: “I have
300 guys who want to come with you.”
The discussions ended with a vote among the tribe that was orchestrated by
Sheikh Sabah al-Janabi, who has become Moltz’s point man in persuading
others to switch to the Americans’ side.
In August, Moltz began signing contracts with the sheikhs lined up by Sabah.
The documents set out in detail what the Americans expect for their money,
from the deployment of patrols to the elimination of anyone who attacks
their soldiers.
US forces will not go on operations with their new Sunni allies but will
support them with fire-power or helicopters if necessary. The model is
spreading. Deals have also been done with insurgents in Diyala province,
north of Baghdad, which Al-Qaeda once proclaimed part of the “Islamic
Caliphate of Iraq”. Today, 25 tribes in the area have men on the US payroll
and Al-Qaeda is on the run.
In the Amariya district of western Baghdad, a Sunni leader known as Abu Abed
has received 50 fighters and weapons from sheikhs in Anbar, and is fighting
with a militia to eject Al-Qaeda.
As for Jurf as Sakhr, the town is slowly being restored to life. The Americans
are moving quickly to rebuild, reflecting another component of Petraeus’s
strategy to bring order to war-torn areas wherever possible.
There are plans to remove the piles of concrete rubble that were once shops or
homes. Teenagers have been hired to clear the streets of rubbish. Moltz and
Sabah walked round with an engineer last week, working out what needs to be
done.
“There is no doubt that he [Sabah] was one of the bad guys,” Moltz said. “It’s
not easy doing business with someone who may have been responsible for some
of the operations against us. But this area is secure now.”
Sabah is circumspect about his former role in attacks on American soldiers and
it has never been discussed openly with his new allies. “I know some people
were fighting the coalition forces,” he said cautiously, “but now is the
time for peace.”
Moltz is hoping to build a new police station, start a medical clinic and
renovate the municipal offices. “Every time in the past I’ve talked about
something good, or started a project that’s good for the town, a bomb would
follow within 24 hours,” Moltz said “This time, nothing. That leads me to
one of two conclusions. Either we have killed all of the enemy, or they
[Sabah and his friends] were the enemy.”
He shook his head and made for the exit, only to find no fewer than seven
sheikhs blocking his way. Nervously fingering their robes, they asked to
discuss getting their men into the new American force. “We’re very happy to
work with you,” Moltz said. “Talk to Sheikh Sabah.”
Anatomy of a tribal revolt: click here
"But how do we get those damn Iraqi politicians to start talking to one another?"
Dear Alex, from Seattle-USA, just read again the article. The solution is written crystal clear.
Here's a hint: the name of the cure starts with "Dol" and ends with "Lar". But we are not talking homeopathy, here. Rather enormously massive doses and over an extremely long treatment...
Ronnie, PARIS, FRANCE
God bless Gen. Petraeus! If this man had been running the show from day one, instead of that "intellectually bankrupt" Don Rumsfeld, we would have won this war long ago. I just hope my fellow Democrats will give this surge some more time because it is obviously working. But how do we get those damn Iraqi politicians to start talking to one another?
Alex, Seattle, USA
its not going to work in iraq its civil war untill the end of life thats the trut but no one like it. they are to many tribes to many diffrent believers to many diffrent etinich race one guy manged to control it even in some wrong ways was sadam
adam alkilani, newcastle, uk
i think the tide in iraq is changeing,and in the u.s. favour.i think the tribal sheiks have realised that al queda are more of a threat than a help.the u.s. stratergy of bribery followed by harts and minds will work.it reminds me of t.e. lawrence in ww1 fighting the turks.massive fire power will never be the answer,iraq is to a complex question.money and the thought of people loseing power/influence all ways talks.
jarrod taylor, leic, u.k.
In Iraq,Sunnis are so easy to buy, I am surprised that US force did not try this strategy before. We should also make offers to the Mahdi Army to see if Moqtada Sadr has a price to turn his militas on Al Qaeda.
John Kay, Manchester, UK