The British difficulties in southern Iraq resulted largely from the classic error of allowing political pressure at home to shape operations.

The big problem was a lack of “boots on the ground” for which the government – anxious to reduce domestic criticism of its involvement in Iraq – was largely responsible, although senior commanders cannot escape blame.

At the end of the 2003 war, Britain had 18,000 troops spread around bases in the four southern provinces of Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan and Muthanna. By the end of 2003 that number had reduced to little more than 8,000, with only four operational infantry battalions. This was a calamitous misjudgment.

“At the top end our own chiefs failed to press home the need for more troops to remain in southern Iraq after the battle,” said one senior officer who served in Iraq in 2003.

Iraq timeline: five years of conflict

From accusations that the weapons of mass destruction dossier had been sexed-up to withdrawal of British troops from Basra

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“We knew we would succeed [in toppling Saddam], there was never any doubt, and we all knew that we would then enter a honeymoon period of peace-support operations which would be vital in winning hearts and minds. But when the initial fighting was over we were left with a force smaller than that which was based in Northern Ireland.”

Within weeks of the allied victory, ordinary Iraqis in Basra were asking troops patrolling the city by day where they were at night “when the bad men come out firing their guns”.

Although British troops were on standby to deploy after dark it was largely left to a hopelessly inadequate police force. The city by night became increasingly anarchic with sporadic bursts of gunfire. Anyone seen assisting the British by day found themselves visited by “the bad men” at night. Intelligence dried up.

Reconstruction was underfunded and difficult with criminality hampering attempts to repair power and water supplies.

“By late 2003 the locals had had enough, the streets were full of sewage, power was limited and jobs were scarce,” another officer said. “With the Iraqi army disbanded, thousands of men were walking the streets.”

Lack of money, and uncertainty over the future provided easy recruits for the militias, particularly the Mahdi Army, which went from being the weakest of the main groups in the south to the strongest.

The population was initially jubilant at the removal of Saddam, but became disillusioned by the deterioration of their lives under the British. Not for the first time, the British Army had arrived as liberators and swiftly turned into the enemy.

Over the next year, there were progressive attempts to increase the numbers of infantry in Iraq without making it look as if the original decision sharply to reduce troop numbers was a mistake. Pretty soon they were unable to go anywhere without the risk of being ambushed.

By late 2005, with deaths rising towards the politically significant 100 figure – the total is now 174 – the number of patrols was reduced in an attempt to stave off the inevitable embarrassment to Tony Blair. But by now there was a much more sinister hand operating behind the militias. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were buying up influence with money and weaponry and providing training, some of it exceptionally good.

The British were being steadily forced out of Basra. In spring this year they pulled out of three of their five main bases around the city, leaving just the Basra Palace and the main base at the airport. With these both under virtual siege from Mahdi Army rockets and mortars, secret negotiations took place to allow a ceasefire and a peaceful withdrawal from the palace. That was followed within weeks by Gordon Brown’s announcement that British troop numbers will be reduced from 4,500 to 2,500 in spring next year.

Many within the US military have suggested the British have effectively been defeated in Basra, provoking Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, to insist: “They’re wrong, they’re completely and utterly wrong.”

The view within the British Army is divided between those who agree with Stirrup’s view that they have achieved all that they could have realistically hoped to do – getting rid of Saddam and handing over to a well trained Iraqi military – and those who agree with the Americans.

Last week a British infantry officer wrote on the internet forum Arrse: “To anyone who thinks we have made it a better place, we haven’t.”

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