THE 1,200-page report published last night by the CIA gives the fullest answer yet to the bitterly-contested questions over Saddam Hussein’s weapons programme.

The document, written by Charles Duelfer, the CIA weapons inspector, confirmed the findings of David Kay, his predecessor as head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), who resigned last year having found no hard evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the time of the coalition’s invasion.

But the report goes on to reflect on Saddam’s motives and ambitions, suggesting he wanted to revive the weapons programme after achieving his primary objective of lifting United Nations sanctions. Mr Duelfer also provides startling evidence that Saddam’s regime was using the UN Oil-for-Food programme to undermine sanctions by rewarding its international allies. Vouchers worth millions of dollars were allocated to senior politicians, officials and corporate figures around the world, while oil contracts.

THE NATURE OF THE REGIME AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH WMD

The reports says: “WMD was an integral element in the range of tools Saddam used to advance his ambitions . . . WMD was not an end in itself.”

Mr Duelfer suggests that understanding the contradictions of the regime has been like “the search for extraterrestrial intelligence”, pointing out that Saddam’s decision-making and documentation do not resemble that of any Western government. Saddam saw himself as leader of the Arab world, as well as being acutely aware of the historic rivalry and threat from Iran, “especially because it was pursuing the very capabilities on WMD which he was denied”. He was also “rankled” over the status of the Gulf states, and mixed hostility to America with attempts to make a deal with the US.

Saddam’s desire for prestige fuelled his efforts to acquire WMD — he did not want to be second to Iran in the race to build a nuclear bomb. The report says that Saddam’s regime of terror fostered deep distrust among his officials. Mr Duelfer complains that his ISG suffered the same problems as the former Iraqi dictator in “not knowing if senior advisers were telling the truth”, while Saddam developed a sophisticated system for avoiding detection.

Mr Duelfer suggests that Saddam had a positive experience of WMD, both to counter internal insurgency and repel Iran’s “human wave attacks” in the 1980s.

There is evidence that he also believed his WMD stockpiles may have stopped the US from entering Baghdad in the Gulf War. The report says he used chemical weapons against a Shia uprising just two months before the first UN inspections began in the summer of 1991.

THE DISPOSAL OF WMD

The report says that in January 1991, Iraq was a few years away from producing a nuclear weapon, but coalition bombing during the Gulf War destroyed much of its capability. The imposition of UN sanctions and inspections teams after the war further hobbled the programme.

The report says: “It appears Saddam shifted tactics to preserve what he could of this programme (scientific talent, dual-use equipment and designs) — while simultaneously deciding to dispose of the weapons. It now appears clear that Saddam . . . eliminated the existing stocks of WMD during the course of the summer of 1991 in support of the primary objective of getting rid of sanctions . . .(this) was a tactical retreat in his ongoing struggle.”

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