WHEN British troops eventually pull out from southern Iraq, they will leave behind the Islamic Republic of Basra: a mini-state which is more solidly Islamicist than any other part of the country. After a controversial war and two years of painful nation-building, that is an ugly result.

Could Britain have done more to stop the south turning into a religiously repressive region riven with criminality and lethal sectarian violence? One senior British official said yesterday that it could not have done. “We have to be realistic about what we’re going to achieve. We have to accept the consequences of bringing democracy to Iraq.”

He is right that Britain had very little room for manoeuvre. But that worldly tone of detachment — heard from his colleagues, too — overstates the case. It is very different from the passionate dismay of US officials in Baghdad, still battling to leave their imprint on the constitution, four days before the draft is released.

On the contrary, there is a case that Britain should have used its slight influence better — particularly on securing funds for the south.

For two years, Britain has been quietly content to take some credit for Basra’s serenity compared with the cauldron of Baghdad and the centre. Much has been written about British troops’ skill in dealing with locals and the valuable experience of Northern Ireland.

But military commanders are the first to say they have not been decisive. The south has been peaceful because its Shia population and its leaders have chosen that it should be so. They knew that if the US brought in democracy, then the Shia majority, suppressed by Saddam Hussein, would be in power. But the calm concealed the nastiness of the south’s problems. The violence with which Saddam suppressed Shias meant that the south was always going to want to express its version of Islam forcefully once he was gone.

The effects are very visible. Basra used to be a byword for tolerance. But across the south, women are now generally veiled and cloaked. Alcohol sellers have shut down. Pictures of clerics are everywhere.

On top of that, feuds between Shia factions have erupted. The two main parties, Sciri and Dawa, each have their allies. So do tribes and local clerics. Everyone has an allegiance — including the police.

Steven Vincent, a US journalist kidnapped and shot dead recently in Basra, had criticised British officials, saying they “stand above the growing turmoil”, refusing to challenge the Islamists’ claim on the hearts and minds of police officers.

“I don’t think it’s our role to take down pictures of clerics (in police stations)”, said one senior British official yesterday. “That is a sure way to alienate the population.”

In their defence, officials say they have made progress, for instance “in doing away with the blinkered allegiance to one faction rather than another”, said one. He also cites “spectacular successes” such as closing down the Police Intelligence Unit and the Department of Internal Affairs in June, for corruption and bias.

His strongest argument is that Iraqis are choosing what they want. “Islamicisation has the support of 80 per cent of the population in the south,” he adds. “We are dealing with a very, very religious society.”

But what about the 20 per cent? Or women, who may now see family law determined by Islamic principles in the new constitution? Another official, who argued that Britain was indeed trying to shape the constitution, said that even if that were the outcome, Iraqi women would still be better off than Afghan ones. Hardly a comforting argument.

Britain’s best chance for influence probably lay when reconstruction money was doled out. But only $2 billion of the $18 billion-plus allocated by the US Congress was earmarked for the south. Only $1 billion has been spent, most on security.

That is a source of resentment. The complaint is that for all the “restraint” in not attacking the “occupation”, there is no reward. If Britain had won more funds, and made sure more were spent, it might have eased this grievance.

Even now, the desperate need for investment remains a lever over the south, which has most of Iraq’s oil reserves.

At this point, it is fair for British officials to say they have almost no influence left — and that the real battles for the soul of Iraq are in Baghdad, over the constitution. But the air of detachment suggests that the priority is to keep the south peaceful while waiting for the signal to move towards the exits.

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