Iraq in statistics
Iraq Study Group report: full text
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The 100-page report of the Iraq Study Group offers a grim snapshot, cautions of the danger of a regional conflict and makes 79 recommendations based on a co-ordinated military, political and diplomatic effort.
The ten members of the bipartisan panel concede that even their recommendations may not prevent a full-blown civil war and regional conflagration. “There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq,” the report begins. “No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence or a slide toward chaos.”
But, the group contends, if all US frontline combat troops are withdrawn by early 2008, if the Iraqi Government achieves political milestones of its own and if the Bush Administration begins a diplomatic initiative with all powers in the region, including Iran and Syria, “the Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future . . . and America’s credibility, interests and values will be protected”.
Military: A new strategy
The report asks for the withdrawal of all US combat forces in Iraq by the first quarter of 2008, “subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground”. At the same time, it seeks to increase, from 4,000 to 20,000, the number of troops embedded with Iraqi forces. They would be involved almost exclusively in training, equipping and advising the Iraqi Army.
“The primary mission of US forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.” It adds: “The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.” The focus should be on increasing the number and quality of Iraq army brigades, adding at least four in the near term.
In addition, another “vital mission” of the US military would be to maintain rapid- reaction teams and special forces whose main job would be to target al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Even after combat troops have been removed, the US would still maintain a “considerable military presence” in the region in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. The commission also calls for an increased military presence in Afghanistan.
Political: Iraqis must take responsibility
“The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraqis,” the report states. “The United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny.”
The Bush Administration should make clear to the Iraqi Government that it must achieve specific objectives — or “milestones” — otherwise the US should withdraw economic, military and political support.
The main milestones should focus on national reconciliation, security and improving the daily lives of Iraqis. “The Iraqi Government needs to show its own citizens — and the citizens of the United States and other countries — that it deserves continued support.”
To achieve national reconciliation, the report lists a series of steps, including provincial elections by June, a law cracking down on militia, the reintegration of former Baathists into national life and the co-opting of the Sunni minority into a political consensus.
On security, the Iraqi Government “should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi army brigades”. Mr Bush must make clear that the US expects it to deliver on the mile- stones and “make substantial progress” toward them.
The US must make an active effort to engage all parties in Iraq — with the exception of al-Qaeda — including Moqtada al-Sadr and his Shi’ite militia, and Sunni insurgent leaders. Washington should also provide financial and technical support to the Iraqi government to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate militia members.
“It should be unambiguous that continued US political, military and economic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi Government’s demonstrating political will” in achieving the milestones.
Otherwise, “the United States should reduce its political, military or economic support for the Iraqi Government.” Crucially, the withdrawal of US combat troops should continue even if the Iraqi Government fails to meet these benchmarks.
Diplomatic: A regional push
Another co-equal and crucial part of a fresh approach to Iraq should involve a concerted new effort to broker a Middle East peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians, and a regionwide diplomatic offensive that would include direct talks with Iran and Syria.
“The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the central importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the US to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist) and Syria.
“The United States does its ally Israel no favours in avoiding direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
There is no military solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The only lasting peace — based on a two-state solution — will be a negotiated peace. Syria should be rewarded with the Israeli return of the Golan Heights if Damascus stops destabilising Lebanon and seals its borders with Iraq.
On Iraq, the report calls “urgently” for an international Iraq support group made up of all Iraq’s neighbours, including Iran and Syria, Egypt, the Gulf States, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union. The Arab League should also meet in Baghdad.
“Iraq’s neighbours are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.”
It adds: “Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq . . . the US should try to engage them constructively,” using incentives and disincentives.
The report cautions, however, that “our limited contacts with Iran’s Government lead us to believe” that Iran does not want to participate in an international conference.
Other recommendations
The report also advocates a concerted effort to improve the Iraqi oil industry, the US reconstruction efforts and US intelligence gathering.
Problems with the Iraqi police force are so profound that the entire force should be taken over by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, with police commando units becoming part of the new Army.
