MEDIATING with the Iraqi insurgency has long been recognised as the best way to end the country’s worsening violence. But the plan to offer some of Iraq’s estimated 20,000 rebel fighters an amnesty and lure their commanders to the negotiating table is fraught with problems familiar to other states that have attempted similar dialogue.

In Iraq, the focus of the new Government’s initiative is the disaffected Sunni Muslim community. Once the country’s ruling class, the Sunnis today are an embittered and disempowered minority who have waged a bloody campaign to drive out US forces and undermine the Government headed by the Shia majority.

Previous efforts to end violence peacefully in other conflicts offer both hope and despair. The Iraqi experiment will depend heavily on the skill of the negotiators to secure a workable consensus among the deeply divided communities and the myriad insurgent groups.

By far the most successful recent example is South Africa. Decades of apartheid rule and a guerrilla war waged by the African National Congress (ANC) ended peacefully after talks between the two communities in the early 1990s.

The deadlock was broken with an amnesty for ANC fighters, the release of leaders such as Nelson Mandela, and the holding of elections. The process of healing was accelerated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which granted immunity to those guilty of war crimes provided they made a full public confession of their past.

But South Africa succeeded mainly because the ruling white population was handing over power to black majority rule. In Iraq the Sunnis are being asked to accept their reduced status as the third-largest community in the country.

There are far more examples of peace efforts that have failed. The agreement reached at Lancaster House to end the conflict in Rhodesia between the white Government and black guerrillas led to the birth of a democratic state. But the achievements have been destroyed by the subsequent imposition of one-party rule and the rise of the Mugabe dictatorship.

Peacemaking in the Middle East might offer a better example for Iraq. After years of conflict, Israel recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and held face-to-face talks with Yassir Arafat, its leader, a man once branded a terrorist. But years of talks broke down in 2000 with the outbreak of the second intifada, which has claimed thousands of lives.

The radicalisation of Palestinian politics, which led to the election victory of the militant group Hamas this year, should be a warning to Iraq. While some rebel forces might be prepared to deal with the authorities in Baghdad, there will always be more extreme organisations, such as al-Qaeda, in Iraq, determined to keep fighting.

Even if mainstream Sunnis clinch an agreement with the Shia-led Government, hardline Shia groups linked to Iran may also be tempted to take up arms against a deal they regard as too generous.

One lesson from sectarian conflicts in Europe, such as Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, is that peace efforts can take a very long time. The Good Friday agreement signed in 1998 heralded the end of the provisional IRA’s military campaign, but sectarian violence continues and a comprehensive political agreement remains elusive.

The deadly conflict in Sri Lanka offers one final warning. The Government and Tamil Tiger separatists agreed the terms of a ceasefire four years ago that was supposed to end two decades of fighting. But the deal is now unravelling amid daily clashes between troops and rebels. There are real fears that the country is sliding back into all-out civil war.

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