THE best peacekeeper is a good soldier. We have proved this again and again, everywhere from Sinai and Lebanon to the Balkans. And now we are moving to peace operations in Iraq. The operations are not the problem, neither is soldier morale — but hang on to your hat when you think about the outcome.

Many US and British soldiers now consider peace operations familiar ground. Manning checkpoints, conducting patrols, settling civil disturbances without excessive violence, guarding key facilities, supporting civil and political activities — all thought through, trained and practised. The operations have a rhythm, and a certain boring quality — like war, either boring or incredibly terrifying, except in peace operations there is less of the terror. Usually. But in peacekeeping you get the bonus of helping people and sensing their appreciation. For soldiers of every rank, the frustrations and difficulties of military life aside, peacekeeping usually provides opportunities to interact with local people — and soldiers relish helping others, finding in their families, activities and hardships reminders of home and common humanity.

The difficulties for soldiers come when the missions are mixed, when you are snubbed and shot at one day and welcomed the next. Soldiers see the issues in simple terms. They respond straightforwardly, picking sides, choosing favourites — and this has nothing to do with national policy. Many of the US soldiers in Haiti came to appreciate the Force Armée d’Haiti, the uniformed gang of thugs and enforcers they were sent in to defeat — but who came to meetings on time and exhibited a certain amount of discipline. In Bosnia, Nato soldiers often liked the Serbs: they were more respectful and military than Bosnian forces. In Kosovo the soldiers quickly sided with the Serb minority, despite their record of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing, because by then they were underdogs among an Islamic majority.

Peace operations in Iraq will involve all of this and more. A Sunni minority, formerly dominant, is angry and sullen, and in cities such as Mosul is actively resisting US efforts. A Shia majority is stirring, able at last openly to pursue its interests and settle old scores. And then there are the Kurds. And the tribes. Some among each group speak English. They may have connections in the US or Europe, or seek their betterment in alignment with the new forces. But others will maintain their distance, counting on an early coalition departure, resenting the presence of an outside force, steaming with the nationalistic pride of youth. The soldiers will pick their favourites, and this will challenge policy implementation.

But the commanders will be working with local leaders. There will be meetings to arrange humanitarian support, strengthen security and address grievances such as the noise of tanks and helicopters moving at night. All this is pure municipal politics, and the commanders are better at it than you might think. They will be working hard to win hearts and minds.

But some of Iraq’s neighbours will not see all this as just local politics to help the people. They will listen to the rhetoric coming out of Washington and London and see all this as a threat to them across the border. They are likely to fight back in unconventional ways. There are no solid borders in the region — all are permeable. Information and students will filter out; instructions, assistance and action-ready nationalists are likely to come back in. Incidents could begin: a sniping here, a bombing there, or maybe more. Coalition forces need not be targeted, as success for these concerned neighbours requires only that stability in Iraq be endangered and that the reconstruction be disrupted. And then, maybe, the coalition forces will overreact. US and British forces will have their intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, of course, and every means will be used to establish an information network from within the populace. But this isn’t Northern Ireland; it is far more foreign. We will never be as good at ferreting out the secrets as the people who live there are at creating them.

These uncertainties will add to the risks. To compensate, we will want to take pre-emptive action, risking more mistakes. We will seek to develop ties to outside sources of motivation and assistance, and then put pressure on states rather than follow the tougher tasks against terrorists themselves, and thereby accept a widening of the conflict. In this respect, the policies being professed by the Bush Administration are new, more overt, more daring, and perhaps more threatening to some in the region. Rather than stability, they seek a certain destabilisation. Rather than ducking conflict, they might welcome it. But the countervailing powers in the region, countries such as Syria and Iran, have already been warned: they will seek disruption in Iraq at their own peril. And that is one more reason why the best peacekeeper is a good soldier!

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