THIS draft resolution might contain the kernel of a solution to the crisis in Lebanon. But, as it stands, it’s an exercise in avoiding difficult questions.

In one sense, the most encouraging point is that the US and France, with sharply differing opinions, have managed to compromise. But although they have reached a deal between themselves, its glaring weakness is that Lebanon, Israel and Hezbollah have not signed up to it. Lebanon last night rejected the deal as it stands.

France, the US and Britain want this draft resolution to be the first of a pair from the UN Security Council. It calls for a truce (something short of a formal ceasefire) and asks Unifil, the UN force in southern Lebanon, to stay until a new international force arrives.

The second resolution would define the mandate of that force, and set out terms for a permanent ceasefire, the disarming of Hezbollah and the establishment of Lebanon’s permanent borders, including those in the disputed Shebaa Farms region.

In calling for “an immediate cessation of all attacks by Hezbollah” and of “offensive military operations by Israel” this goes some way to answer the fear of many governments that the violence, civilian casualties and desire for revenge on both sides might escalate beyond hope of resolution.

But even though this scheme leaves all the most intractable issues to the second resolution, the draft of the first resolution fails to deal with the immediate obstacles. It does not require a prisoner exchange, although Israel has made the return of the two soldiers captured by Hezbollah a condition for ceasing hostilities. Nor does it mention the return of Lebanese prisoners, an objection raised by Qatar, the Arab representative on the Security Council, which is sympathetic to Lebanon.

Perhaps most inflammatory, the draft does not require Israel to pull out of southern Lebanon until a new UN force arrives (and so, not until after the second resolution). Israel could also argue that it could continue with “defensive” military action to prevent, for example, Hezbollah rearming.

Both Lebanon and Hezbollah object to this clause. Hezbollah said at the weekend that it would not observe a truce while a single Israeli soldier remained on Lebanese soil (it is presumably ignoring, for the sake of rhetoric, the two Israeli soldiers it has kidnapped). If Hezbollah is taken at its word, then that means no truce at all, of the kind that this draft resolution takes as its starting point. Lebanon objects to the draft because it fears that it gives Israel licence to stay inside its borders — and to continue attacking. France, the US and Britain say that a second resolution should follow within a few weeks. But Lebanon’s scepticism that this will happen is entirely understandable, given the complexity of the problems which the second resolution is supposed neatly to tie up.

One of the central problems of the second resolution would be defining the mandate of a new UN force. This week’s draft says that the force would preside over the region from the border to the Litani river, which is Hezbollah’s heartland. Its mission would be to work with the Lebanese army to keep this zone free of all military forces (meaning Hezbollah, but also Israel).

France, Britain and the US also agree that the mandate should be tougher than that of Unifil, derided by Israelis and Lebanese for its inability to take on Hezbollah. But it is still not clear what this means in practice. Should the new force take on Hezbollah aggressively if Hezbollah refuses to disarm? France has emerged as the country most likely to lead the force, but it is far from clear who else would contribute boots on the ground. Many countries would be loathe to do so if Hezbollah does not accept the UN force.

In the gap between the first and second resolutions, the truce is to be monitored by Unifil. Israel wants this force strengthened with French forces, but again, this has not yet been agreed.

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