Even out of uniform Colonel H R McMaster, one of the architects of the US
make-or-break surge strategy in Iraq, is unmistakably a military man.
Arriving at what he calls the “situation room”, his face takes on the look
of mission accomplished. “The main thing is they have snacks here,” he says,
smiling.
McMaster has the direct manner of a soldier but is far more personable than
the textbook version. The bare room where we meet in London is filled by his
passionate determination to explain how the American “surge” – the
controversial campaign that has seen the deployment of 30,000 more troops to
quell the Baghdad insurgency – can still work.
It is his, and the Bush administration’s, biggest challenge since US-led
coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.
McMaster, 44, was part of an elite team of military men, academics and
diplomats who were gathered together late last year in Baghdad by General
David Petraeus, the American commander of forces in Iraq, to brain-storm as
the country deteriorated into internecine bloodletting.
They were charged with coming up with a strategy to stop Iraq descending into
chaos and gain time for the fractious Iraqi government to resolve rivalries
between Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurdish factions and begin governing, and to
train an Iraqi army. They came up with the surge.
“The idea was to break the cycle of violence, provide basic services to people
so that they would see an improvement and rekindle hope, and strengthen the
Iraqi forces,” says McMaster, whose thick neck speaks of years of
soldiering. “Underlying our whole approach is the need to give Iraqis time
to move to a political accommodation.”
Their theory was that the coalition forces could then hand over to the Iraqis
and withdraw from an increasingly unpopular war. The surge was memorably
controversial as it called for sending in tens of thousands more US troops
at a time when opposition to the war was gaining traction.
“What is going on now is not just an insurgency but a communal struggle
incited by Al-Qaeda,” McMaster says. “Al-Qaeda jumpstarted tensions to
incite chaos and succeeded. That allowed them to establish bases where they
could move freely, train and pursue their agenda.”
The lack of rule of law, and insecurity, meant that Iraqis sheltered Al-Qaeda,
most of whom are foreigners. “Al-Qaeda drew on the fears of a community [the
Sunnis, a minority who had been in power under Saddam] that they would be
destroyed or powerless. They persuaded a certain portion of the population
to regard them as protectors.”
Disillusioned angry young men joined them. As field commander, McMaster saw
Al-Qaeda’s tactics: “These guys, many of them teenagers, were brainwashed.
They were sodomised and brutalised. They kept them ignorant and dehumanised
these kids by putting them in beheading units. At the same time they gave
them a sense of belonging. This is really child abuse.”
McMaster is self-effacing about his role, but it was crucial in the
fundamental shift in the course of the Iraq war made by the Bush
administration at the beginning of 2007.
The surge strategy was based on an operation commanded by “HR”, as he likes to
be called (no wonder; the initials stand for Herbert Raymond), in 2006 as
the commanding officer charged with pacifying Tal Afar, a lawless Iraqi town
on the Syrian border which had been taken over by insurgents. The strategy
was “clear, hold and build”, now echoed as a virtual mantra.
McMaster cut off Tal Afar, divided it into small neighbourhoods, cleared each
of insurgents and established permanent posts in each district, instead of
defeating insurgents and then leaving, as had been the earlier American
practice. After earlier operations, the insurgents returned as soon as the
Americans left; in Tal Afar, under McMaster’s reign, the town came back to
life.
Tal Afar clearly seared his soul and fuelled his determination to fight. “I
saw the most unimaginable horrors,” he says. “Things you can’t even imagine
another human thinking of. In one case, the terrorists murdered a young boy
in his hospital bed, booby-trapped the body, and when the family came to
pick up the body they detonated the explosives to kill the father.”
In another case, a retarded 13-year-old girl was strapped with explosives,
given the hand of a three-year-old toddler to hold, and told to walk into a
line of police recruits. They pressed the button when the girls were amid
the waiting men.
He did, however, see the tide turn against the insurgents, who were mostly
Saddam supporters bitter at their loss of power. “Shops opened, kids went
back to school, there were people on the streets again,” he says.
“It happened with astonishing speed. Once we had lifted the pall of fear, we
began getting a wave of human intelligence.”
He learnt a lot about how Iraqi society worked and how the close family and
tribal ties could be used. Bush, on announcing the “new way forward”,
pointed to McMaster’s success in Tal Afar as “the outlines of the Iraq we’ve
been fighting for”.
While Baghdad is too big to be isolated in the way that Tal Afar was, the
surge plan being implemented has used the same tactics – sealing off
districts of the capital, clearing out insurgents and leaving American units
in place to stop the insurgents from reinfiltrating.
McMaster’s blueprint for his successful Tal Afar operation, and later the
surge, was informed by his critical analysis of the joint chiefs of staff’s
role in the defeat in Vietnam, which resulted in a book called Dereliction
of Duty. It is also fed by what one senses is his innate common sense,
practical experience and study of the Iraqi people that few in the military
have bothered with. He has been seconded as a research fellow to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
Like Petraeus, he is one of America’s brightest, a soldier scholar who
graduated from the US Military Academy and then earned a doctorate. But is
it the right formula, too late?
There have been similar promises. Operations Together Forward and Together
Forward II last summer also envisaged Iraqi forces taking the lead in
Baghdad. Only two of the six battalions promised by the Iraqi government
turned up. The plan failed and Baghdad descended into the worst bloodletting
yet seen.
The number of Iraqi civilian deaths have fallen since the surge reached full
strength on June 15, but the number of American casualties has risen. US
generals have said they expect attacks to increase in September, when
Petraeus is due to report on the surge’s progress.
It does not look good but McMaster makes it possible to see a break in the
doom-laden fog of war. For example, a report ordered by the increasingly
recalcitrant US Congress found mixed progress at best. Of 18 benchmarks
meant to measure progress in Iraq, eight, mostly in military and security
sectors, showed improvement.
“The enemy understands the importance of General Petraeus’s testimony, then,
and will do all they can to murder more innocents and create a sense of
hope-lessness,” McMaster says.
Many Iraqis think it is too late. But McMaster does not see US forces leaving
for at least two years, although there may be a drawdown in the numbers.
“All is feasible, but it all takes time,” he says, sipping a coffee.
“You are beginning to see what can be achieved, like local ceasefires and
agreement between family elders in one town.” He believes that is the way
forward – building a local consensus and translating it into a broader
working agreement: “Everyone is focused on the big national solution, like
there is this big magic wand. Local agreements are something you can build
up from.”
He believes the big difference now is the Iraqis “have learnt what happens to
their lives when Al-Qaeda comes”. It’s important to him that people
understand how the insurgency evolved – essentially he sees three wars in
Iraq today: the internal battle between Shi’ite and Sunni communities; the
battle being waged by Al-Qaeda and its allies against the coalition forces;
and the meddling by Iran and Syria. There is no easy solution.
“We have already seen what can happen if forces withdraw from an area without
setting conditions for enduring security – a capable and legitimate police,
a functioning local government, reconciliation between tribes and sects that
had succumbed to Al-Qaeda’s effort to incite a cycle of violence,” he says.
“The chaos this cycle of violence represents prevents anything positive
happening – no economic development, no development of security forces or
establishment of the rule of law, no strengthening of local government or
delivery of basic services.
“Because countries in the region are likely to be party to what would become a
destructive civil war, there seems little prospect for the conflict burning
out on its own after which there could be a peaceful settlement. The
conflict could easily bleed over. Those who speak theoretically about
outcomes like a ‘soft partition’ really know very little about Iraq.”
McMaster holds no illusions that the democratic Iraq that was the euphoric
vision of many in Washington after Saddam was toppled will emerge in time
for presidential elections in 2008, or any time soon. The picture is dark,
even when painted by a believer. “It depends on how you define success,” he
says. “This internal war will not end short of a generation.”
In the near future the best that can be hoped for is what he calls
“sustainable stability” – a low level of violence that would allow US troops
to withdraw and Iraqis to live relatively normal lives while hoping that
their government and armed forces eventually get control.
“If we leave now, there would be chaos,” he says.
Sectarian violence would increase, Iraqis would be more fearful of their
future and a besieged Iraqi government would be less likely to go ahead with
political reconciliation.
What is refreshing about McMaster is that unlike so many of his US military
brethren who ruled like conquerors after the fall of Baghdad, and alienated
Iraqis not just by killing them at checkpoints but also with their rudeness,
McMaster knows and cares about them.
“So many of us have great Iraqi friends now,” he says. “We know their
families. As soldiers, we go there and we’re at risk but nobody complains.
These people are caught in the violence; they don’t deserve it. The war will
not stop if we leave. It will get worse. We can’t allow that to happen.”
If there had been more McMasters in Baghdad in the beginning, and less US
hubris, Iraqis might be in a far better position.
Having known McMaster since grade school, I can tell you that whatever he is, it doesn't include simplistic. He's a lifelong student of history, and he's not afraid to tell those above him that they're drawing the wrong conclusions. Whatever mistakes were made in the decision to invade (a subject on which McMaster was not consulted), he has never lost sight of the fact that Iraq remains vital to the stability of the Middle East and thus to the world. So once given a job, he studied the region, listened to the residents, and as a lowly colonel had the courage to implement a new approach which, had it failed, would probably have ended his career. Now the combination of his battlefield leadership and strategic insight has provided us with the greatest hope for stability in years. Not yet peace, not yet prosperity, not yet democracy - but stability, from which those things can emerge. Anyone who finds fault with that is selfishly hoping for failure because it's an American effort.
Sean M. Corr, Doylestown, USA/Pennsylvania
I worked as a U.S. Army Contractor at FOB Sykes, home of COL McMaster's 3d ACR. The security turn-around in Tal 'Afar, Iraq came about as a result of his brilliantly executed plan. We were tasked with providing "safe haven" for Iraqi civilians that wanted to leave Tal 'Afar during the clearing operations in September 2005, but only 30 civilians took advantage of our facilities and they soon returned to their homes. As far as the town being leveled or treated like Fallujah, the amount of lights that were visible from the residents at night only increased. I have read several accounts, by different authors, regarding the 3d ACR's operations and fully believe that the truth was told. COL McMaster's proved that his plan would work and Tal 'Afar and northwestern Iraq would be a safer place today if his operations continued.
Sid Whitt, Visalia, California, USA
We as american citizensshould hear more about Col. McMaster and the success of his men. He should be given all the support he needs to continue his humanitarian work in Irag. I hope the military powers that be realize what a great leader they have in you. God Bless you Col. McMaster!!!!
pr Bossert, lansdale, pa USA
"The majority of attacks are against the coalition forces. There is no reason to believe the Iraqis would attack the Iraq government forces if the coalition forces left. The occupation is the problem."
Really? Well why are they mortaring the parliament every day and assassinating politicians? Why are they car bombing Shia Muslims en masse, blowing up police stations and Army patrols? Why are most of their victims IRAQIS?
And, if anyone doubts McMaster's credentials about being a 'scholar', then they should read his groundbreaking book on the Vietnam War, Dereliction of Duty. Moltke and Clausewitz were military men too - does that mean they weren't scholars?
As for 'mini-fallujah', people should read Bing West's No True Glory for a truthful account of that campaign instead of believing the garbage that is pumped out by Al-Jazeera, the Guardian and the BBC. And to describe McMaster as a 'war criminal' is juvenile left-wing drivel.
The comments on here are pathetic.
N John, N. lanarkshire, Scotland
Alex, if you have found "no news coming out of Tal'Afar", then you are not looking, and referring to COL McMaster as a "war criminal" is absolutely hilarious. For the record, I served in Tal'Afar with COL McMaster during 2005-2006, and our success in that city was monumental. The success we had was due to the fact that we did NOT destroy the city, as was the case in Fallujah (in which I also fought during 2003-2004), but aided the locals and assisted them and developed intelligence that we were able to action on. Here is my suggestion: search "Google" for the letter that the Tal'afar Mayor (Najim Al-jibouri) wrote to President Bush, and that should explain COL McMaster's actions in Tal'afar in a clear manner. But in any case, you're French, so no one cares about your opinion anyway.
CavTroop, Garfenwohr, Germany
Successful military commanders have rarely been scholars and I don' t trust them. The success, for now, of the surge is due only to the relative calm it has brought. If the US military established calm in the first place, three years ago matters would be much better. You don't establish calm with softly softly and harts and minds but by pulverizing the enemy. This was not done.
As for the Americans acting in a high handed brutal manner against the Iraqis, this is typical British crap. The Arabs appreciate order and a "strong horse". The number of Iraqis killed by other Iraqis and Arab al Qaeda is infinitely larger than the ones killed by the Americans.
George Steiner, Lachine, Quebec, Canada
Strategists such as McMaster were out of touch with the history, religion and Iraq when they formulated the surge policy. This continued surge will result in the purge of the troops of US and allies sooner or later!
Partition Iraq into Shiastan, Sunnistan and Kurdistan before it is too late and a Vietnam like situation develops. Cut and run will be the best policy even at this late stage of the game!
Regards,
Krishna R. Kumar, Udupi, India
"McMaster’s blueprint for his successful Tal Afar operation". Absolutely no news has been allowed to come out of Tela'far, so no-one knows what really happened there. The impression from the fragments that came out was that it was a sort of mini-Falluja (Tela'far is a very small town), with the town wrecked from end to end. You find it justifiable to talk to war criminals, Marie Colvin?
Alex, Paris, France
The Iraqis reached an agreement, conditional on the coalition setting a timetable for withdrawal, last year. it appears the only agreement acceptable is one that includes coalition forces staying. That insures a guerilla war.
The majority of attacks are against the coalition forces. There is no reason to believe the Iraqis would attack the Iraq government forces if the coalition forces left. The occupation is the problem.
Dennis , Ensenada, Mexico/ Baja California
Another excellent, well-balanced piece of analysis on the current situation in Iraq , by the London Times. If only most of the major U.S. media could follow suit, and abandon their subjective, one sided reporting.; and if only anti-Bush members of Congress, could put aside their partisan glasses, and examine the pros and cons of the situation in an impartial manner., the U.S. public would get a truer picture of what is actually happening.
Minoo Adenwalla, Appleton, Wisconsin, U.S.A.
HR sees 3 conflicts in train.
Anthony Cordesman counts 7, and Chatham House counts 9 distinct sources of violence (including HR's 3).
If either of the other 2 analyses is correct - and I would choose the Chatham House version - then HR's analysis is characteristically American, in that it is too simplistic. It is at least 4 factors adrift of a solution for Iraq as a whole.
Philip Sturtivant, Buckingham, England
More british whining!
Richard Brown, Cazenovia, NY