“Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different.” – T. S. Eliot

When AS Roma take on Manchester United tomorrow, it will be the fifth time in less than a year that the teams have squared off. And while their encounters have made headlines for a variety of reasons, perhaps this one should be remembered as something of a passing of the torch.

Because the “strikerless formation” pioneered by Luciano Spalletti, the Roma manager, has been taken, tweaked, readjusted and raised to the highest level by Sir Alex Ferguson.

Manchester United in their present incarnation – with Carlos Tévez, Wayne Rooney, Cristiano Ronaldo and Ryan Giggs moving seamlessly across the line of attack, befuddling opponents by continually switching positions and leaving no points of reference – appear to have evolved directly out of Spalletti’s “4-6-0” experiment three seasons ago. Although there are differences, their movement and use of space is based on the same principles.

Steve McClaren, the former England head coach, talked about it on TheGame Podcast a few weeks back and it is worth remembering his words. “Roma introduced this system and it’s very difficult to play against,” he said. “I watched them against Real Madrid and it was total football – everybody defends, everybody attacks.

United have been developing it and, I believe, they can improve on it.”

By now, you are probably familiar with how the system works. There is no centre forward. Francesco Totti is nominally the farthest player up the pitch, but he has licence to roam and, in fact, often doubles back to hit passes out to the wings. This leaves the opposition central defenders with a dilemma. If they track Totti, an injury doubt for tomorrow’s match, they leave a gap that a runner from the midfield can exploit; if they stay where they are, Roma have a man advantage in midfield and “in the hole”.

Roma’s front four is completed by two pacy wingers, such as Rodrigo Taddei and Mancini, both of whom can play on either flank and enjoy cutting inside, and Simone Perrotta, whose late runs into the penalty area, Frank Lampard-style, turn him into an adjunct striker. Throw in two attacking full backs and a deeplying, playmaker such as David Pizarro (a role interpreted by Paul Scholes in the United version) and Spalletti’s attacking machinery is complete.

As McClaren points out, it works because most teams defend deep, denying space behind the defenders. But, given that space is finite, if you deny it behind the back four, you have to concede it in front. And if your opponents have a quartet of talented and creative attacking players in that area, you are in for a bumpy ride.

Of course, the system is not fool-proof. It works with Tévez, Giggs, Ronaldo and Rooney, but it probably would not work with Nicolas Anelka, Didier Drogba, Lampard and Joe Cole. Not because the Chelsea quartet are any worse, but because they have different characteristics.

Spalletti’s genius lay in realising the qualities of the players at his disposal, developing a system that exploited them and having the courage to introduce it. That said, as with many great inventions, necessity played a big part in its birth. It was prompted when an injury crisis among his strikers left Totti as the only able-bodied front man. Rather than forcing him to play up front on his own, thereby negating some of his most obvious skills, Spalletti conjured up the “strikerless system”.

It has allowed Roma to thrive in fairly remarkable circumstances. The club’s finances are a mess after the excesses of the past (when they thought nothing of spending £25 million on a 31-year-old Gabriel Batistuta), which meant that Spalletti has had to operate on a shoestring budget, selling players off to finance acquisitions (the most recent being Christian Chivu, the Romanian, who was sold to Inter Milan for £9 million).

Yet under Spalletti, Roma finished second in Serie A last season, while winning the Italian Cup and reaching the quarter-finals of the Champions League. This year, they are again among Europe’s elite eight, while sitting second in Serie A behind Inter.

Whether other clubs will choose to emulate Spalletti’s model and build on it in the way United have, remains to be seen. For now, expect to see two teams mirroring each other tomorrow evening, at least as far as tactics are concerned. In terms of personnel, it is a different story. United are far stronger, which will probably only serve as a reminder that systems are only as good as the players who make them work.

Lost in translation

Since his departure from Chelsea in September, José Mourinho has been linked with top jobs across Europe: AC Milan, Barcelona, Bayern Munich and, recently, Inter Milan. Most of those links have come from one of two (legitimate) sources close to the “Special One”. One of those sources told the world’s press on Friday that Mourinho was in Milan, meeting Massimo Moratti, the Inter president, with a view towards taking over the club next year.

On Saturday, Mourinho issued a statement denying the story. I won’t name the source who keeps linking Mourinho to every wealthy club under the sun (he is a good man and there is no reason to do that, although reports have named him). But perhaps this would be a good time for Mourinho to ensure that, to avoid further embarrassment, his entourage sings from the same hymn sheet.

Winning candidate

Speaking of managers on the market, Louis van Gaal announced that he will step down as AZ Alkmaar coach at the end of the season. By the time he left Barcelona in 2000, he was 49 and had won three Dutch titles, two Spanish titles, a Dutch Cup, a Spanish Cup, a Uefa Cup, a Champions League and World Club Championship. Since then he has won nothing, but with a CV such as that, you would have thought that someone would be interested.

Van Gaal’s enemies say that he can be stubborn, arrogant and aggressive, but when did those qualities necessarily become negatives in club management?