THE HISTORY of rivalry between Nick Faldo and Paul Azinger includes a singles match at The Belfry in 1993 when the two confronted each other in the final pairing. The Englishman edged ahead with a hole-in-one at the 14th, was pegged back with a birdie at the next and watched on the last green as his opponent holed a six-footer for half a point.

The trouble was that the outcome was irrelevant. The USA had already won the trophy, thanks to Raymond Floyd’s three birdies on the back nine, and Azinger was annoyed by Faldo’s failure to concede what was a meaningless putt. When they meet as captains in today’s final session of the 37th Ryder Cup, it will be their jobs to ensure that the best players are not reduced to bit-part roles.

Even they would have to admit that the captain’s job is overrated. The most accomplished and thorough of leaders still find themselves at the mercy of the form of their players. Azinger did more than most by overhauling the American selection process but his power to influence his team’s overall performance is relatively limited. The American said earlier this week that he had spent two years holding back the bow of his arrow; now it was time to let go and hope that it flew in the right direction.

But a strategy for Sunday afternoon is one of a few specific tasks that captains have to perform sensibly. While wild-card selections and pairings for Friday and Saturday are important, the singles is arguably more so, given that 12 points are at stake, nearly half of those available all week.

How the 2008 Ryder Cup was won

Follow the final day's play from Valhalla as the 37th Ryder Cup draws to a dramatic conclusion with today's singles matches

• Mission accomplished for United States

• Justin Rose's Ryder Cup diary: I'm heartbroken

• Analysis: misfiring big three cost Europe dear in Ryder Cup

Europe surrender under brilliant assault

The US reclaimed the Ryder Cup for first time since 1999 with a sustained performance in the singles matches at Valhalla

• Elementary approach pays off for J.B. Holmes

• Nick Faldo's bold approach backfires in failure to reclaim initiative from US

• Ryder Cup warning signs to watch out for

Multimedia

• The key moments, match by match

• Is Faldo to blame for Europe's defeat?

Related Links

• Rookie Oliver Wilson is strongest link

• Patriot games turn ugly

As valuable as three of the previous sessions put together, it has the potential to transform the match’s complexion, as Ben Crenshaw discovered at Brookline in 1999. The Americans were 10-6 down on Saturday night when George W Bush delivered his Alamo speech, and the American captain decided to front-load his singles order. Far from being a stroke of tactical genius, it was a move forced on him by the scoreline, but it paid off in spectacular fashion. The US won each of their first seven matches, the session by 8½-3½ and the match by a single, theatrical point.

It was a strategy popularised by Sam Torrance in 2002, this time when circumstances did not demand it. The teams were locked at eight points apiece on Saturday night, but the Scot took a dramatic gamble by sending them out in order of ability.

Colin Montgomerie led the way with his defeat of Scott Hoch, and although Sergio Garcia lost the second match, victories by Bernhard Langer, Padraig Harrington and Thomas Bjorn helped to set up Paul McGinley’s match-winning putt in the ninth pairing. Hoping that his strongest players would not leave his weakest with work to do, Europe’s captain also intended to make the most of momentum, as well as the backing of a home crowd.

The success of Europe under Torrance has made his example the fashionable one to follow, but it is far from the only option, especially when the match is tight.

Jack Nicklaus, who was the US captain in 1983 and 1987 and has recently presided over their success in the Presidents Cup, has a more complex take on singles tactics.

“We’ve heard a lot about ‘front-loading’ or putting the best players out first to establish early momentum,” he said. “That’s what Sam Torrance did on the final day at The Belfry in 2002 and it worked very well. But Sam’s strategy would have been too big a gamble for me.

“I like to spread my six best players fairly evenly in two-player parcels. I want two excellent players at the beginning, two in the middle and two at the end. Good players in the middle of the lineup are crucial. First, it helps prevent too many losses in succession, which has an immense effect on the other team’s momentum. Second, they have the comfort of knowing there are two more lions there to pick up the slack if they don’t play well. It also works well for the weaker players in your lineup, as they know they’re sandwiched between great players.”

And yet, for all the caution in that strategy, there is another approach that has the look almost of an insurance policy: leave the best players until last so that, when the pressure mounts, it will be handled by the right men.

Of course, the fatal flaw in that arrangement is that it might be too late for them to exert any influence, as it was for Faldo and Azinger in 1993, and for Tiger Woods, Phil Mickelson and Davis Love III in 2002. Their matches at the Belfry were the last three of that singles session, and the US captain, Curtis Strange, was slaughtered for it afterwards. Had Torrance not taken the opposite approach, Strange might have escaped the ridicule.

“When you figure the matches are going to be tough or tight, you have to put your couple of big guns at the end,” said the American. “It’s as simple as that. If I had been sitting here as a winner, I don’t think we’d be going through this. I don’t think that, just because we lost, it’s fair to second-guess.”

In truth, it was a mistake, a tactic perhaps to be tried only in the event of a significant overnight lead. Only once since 1969 has the Ryder Cup been decided by the final match, and that was at Kiawah Island in 1991. The opening tie tends to be more important, which is why Montgomerie will be missed today, more than any other day. Unbeaten in eight singles matches, the Scot had established himself as a figurehead in the opening match.

For all his eccentricities at Valhalla, even Faldo knows better than to leave too much in reserve. Padraig Harrington is his best player, with three victories in four singles appearances, and a new-found ability to intimidate opponents. Beyond that, Lee Westwood and Sergio Garcia are his most experienced options, although the Spaniard has a poor record in the singles.

In the US team, Mickelson and Jim Furyk have won six singles points between them. Only two other Americans – Stewart Cink and Chad Campbell – have ever won on the final day. They used to say the Americans came into their own as individuals. The singles are a better measure of ability, and of a team’s strength in depth.

In the last two Ryder Cups, when Europe have enjoyed landslide victories, so too have they dominated the final session. These days, as the world rankings reveal, Europe have the better players, and it is time, once again, for them to show it.

FINAL RECKONING

OVERALL RECORD

Europe 10 wins (3 as GB & Ireland), 2 ties USA 24 wins

SINGLES POINTS WON 1983-2006

Europe 71 USA 73

LARGEST VICTORY MARGIN

Europe 9pts in 2004 and 2006 (18½-9 ½) USA 15pts in 1967 (23½-8½)

BEST FINAL DAY COMEBACK

Trailing 9-7, Europe won 14½-13½ in 1995

Trailing 10-6, USA won 14½-13½ in 1999

MOST SINGLES POINTS WON

Europe 7 Neil Coles, Colin Montgomerie; 6½ Nick Faldo, Peter Oosterhuis, Peter Alliss

USA 6 Arnold Palmer, Sam Snead, Billy Casper, Lee Trevino; 5 Tom Kite, Gene Littler